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NATIONAL REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

Walter Lippmann: Defeatist

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Will the Chinese Overthrow Mao?

RODNEY GILBERT

The Best of Everything

RICHARD M. WEAVER

Articles and Reviews by . . . . . MORRIE RYSKIND
JOHN CHAMBERLAIN · PYRRHO · WILLMOORE KENDALL
L. BRENT BOZELL · F. A. VOIGT · E. MERRILL ROOT

from WASHINGTON *straight*

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

The Budget: Good News

The budget will be balanced, the national debt will be slightly reduced, and there will be a small cut in taxes. This is the information National Review has received from authoritative congressional sources. Federal income is expected to exceed present estimates, but the principal saving will come from a substantial slash in foreign aid, which (contrary to the Administration proposal) will be held to an annual rather than long-term basis.

A Name to Conjure With

In 1952 the Republican Party went far afield from orthodox political circles to choose its Presidential candidate. Some of the party's most influential leaders in Washington are giving considerable thought to a repetition of that successful strategy. The name they conjure with is J. Edgar Hoover.

New Hampshire Strategy

Senator Styles Bridges, who in '54 received the largest vote ever given a Senatorial candidate in New Hampshire, may run as a delegate "favorable to Eisenhower" in the March 13 primary. Under New Hampshire law, a delegate may either be "favorable" to a specified candidate or "pledged." The latter must support the candidate until released; the former has discretionary rights after the first ballot. In case Mr. Eisenhower does not seek re-election, Senator Bridges' support would go to Senator Knowland and checkmate any ambition of Sherman Adams to name Ike's successor.

Wickard in Indiana

Claude Wickard, former Secretary of Agriculture and former Rural Electrification Administrator, is seeking the Democratic Senatorial nomination in Indiana to oppose Senator Capehart. Depressed farm prices and a faction-torn GOP give the Democrats, in normally Republican Indiana, an excellent chance to gain Capehart's Senate seat.

For More Aid

Gov. G. Mennen Williams of Michigan, one of the dark horses in the Democratic Presidential paddock, finds himself in "profound disagreement" with leading congressional Democrats on foreign aid. Unlike Senator George (a recent convert to "charity begins at home"), Governor Williams believes the Democratic foreign aid program should be "considerably broader in scope and resources than that of the Eisenhower Administration."

School Aid

Federal aid to schools is out for this session. Congress will attach a desegregation rider (to outlaw allocation of funds where integration is not in force). Result: no federal school aid at all.

Primaries

Wisconsin Republicans have entered a primary slate of convention delegates pledged to Eisenhower, but the President must signify his consent by March 2. Should Mr. Eisenhower decline, the contest could become a test of strength between Vice President Nixon and Senator Knowland. (Both the President and the Senator have been entered in the April 10 Illinois primary, where consent is not required.)

Conservative Multitude

James H. Gipson, Sr., President and Managing Director of The Caxton Printers, Ltd., of Caldwell, Idaho, told Washington reporters this week that "an immense multitude of Americans are hoping for a conservative candidate on either ticket." Predicting that Mr. Eisenhower will not run, and that either Knowland or Nixon could defeat any Democratic Liberal, Mr. Gipson said he saw foreign giveaway programs, Communism and bureaucratic waste as the three foremost issues of the day.

Farm Bill to Pass

Passage of the Administration farm program without major amendment is generally predicted. Secretary Benson reports an immediate upturn in farm morale, and Mid-West agricultural experts agree that the new plan will reduce surpluses and help restore market prices. Democratic cries of plagiarism will continue, but with little visible political effect. Some conservative Republicans privately concede, however, that the Eisenhower regime now offers a reasonable facsimile of the New Deal.

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The WEEK

Mr. Adlai Stevenson, who simply "sends" our civil libertines, is, of course, a charter foe of "McCarthyism." And if asked just what he is a charter foe of, he would most likely define "McCarthyism" as a means of damaging one's political opponent through the cynical use of the smear. Such a thing Stevenson is, as we say, against, which is why he himself draws such precise indictments—as when, a week ago, he told the world that Secretary Dulles is clearly "willing to play Russian roulette with the life of our nation."

Czech President Zapotocky and Foreign Minister David have lavishly praised Marshal Tito. In view of Tito's recent efforts to torpedo the Baghdad Pact—the defensive alliance of the northern tier of Middle East states—the praise is no more than his due. More interesting, however, is Zapotocky's announcement that "hundreds" of Czech Titoists have been released from jail. It is additional evidence of Moscow's newfound affection for the big and little Communist dignitaries who, in the internal struggles preceding Stalin's death, broke away from party discipline. Such persons are banded together in tiny, but influential, groups in France, Italy and other countries. If Moscow's intrigues are successful, the Titoists will be invaluable in bringing about Popular Fronts of the kind the Moscow Communists, at the moment, are urging in France.

The lowly sparrow has been declared a public enemy of Red China's Five-Year-Plan and will be (or so promises an official policy announcement in Peiping) "basically eliminated by 1962." Experts on China differ as to the date of Mao's elimination, and one of the shrewdest, Mr. Rodney Gilbert, is heard from in this connection in this issue (**"Will The Chinese** Overthrow Mao?", p. 17). But we are willing to give the highest odds, say a year of NATIONAL REVIEW against a year of the *Reporter*, that a sparrow or two will chirp away at the funeral of the People's Republic of China.

The Administration, on reading the *New York Times,* may very well feel like praying for protection from its friends. **"The really big story here** [in Washing-

ton]," wrote James Reston, the *Times'* chief Washington correspondent, recently, "is that the Republicans are offering a program and a budget that are so New Dealist and internationalist that Bob Taft, if he were here, would feel betrayed." This, we have a hunch, is the kind of pat on the back that will leave the Grand Old Party gasping for breath.

The "soil bank" plan, according to which the government will pay farmers for not raising crops, suggests a new economic principle. We hear that a local manufacturer has asked Treasury officials how much they will give him for not making Kewpie dolls next year; and we are thinking of a new promotion campaign in which, for a government guarantee of seven dollars, we will in turn give the subscriber a guarantee not to send NATIONAL REVIEW for a full year.

On Saturday morning, January 14, a thousand spectators, gathered on Pier 42, Hudson River, New York City, witnessed a modest but wonderfully auspicious ceremony. *Wolna Polska* ("Free Poland"), the first ship of a Free Polish marine, a ten-thousand-ton cargo vessel, set sail for the seven seas. A group of Americans of Polish descent, headed by Mr. Frank Piasecki, have organized as the Pulaski Transportation Line, with a company flag not distinguishable from the flag of the Republic of Poland. The ship is manned by a crew of Polish sailors who refused to submit to Communist oppression. The captain is Jan Cwiklinski, once master of the *Batory,* who escaped to the free world with such firm courage. Bon voyage!

The U. S. v. Hughes

It is too early to capture in detail the significance of the trial of Paul H. Hughes—but not too early to predict that his trial will prove to be deeply significant.

Here is a man of manifest political sophistication who decided to cash in on the really profitable racket of recent years—what was described to the jury as "the hatred and credulity" of the professional enemies of Senator McCarthy during the turbulent years of 1953 and 1954. He found rich and ready customers. For instance, the *Washington Post.* For instance, Joseph Rauh, of the ADA. For instance, the Democratic National Committee.

Hughes' reports on McCarthy's villainy, for which he had by October of 1954 realized at least ten thousand eight hundred dollars ($8,500 from Rauh, $2,300 from the Democrats), finally struck a researcher on the *Washington Post* as so fantastic that he started checking—and discovered that Mr. Hughes' story was a very long lie, beginning to end. It was a lucky thing the researcher stumbled onto the truth, because the God-fearing and square-shooting *Washington Post* was just about ready to run twelve long articles on McCarthy. These were prepared by one of its major heavyweights—no less a man than Alfred Friendly, now managing editor of the *Post*—and called for the prosecution of McCarthy for all manner of offenses against society, all of them the product of the fertile imagination of Mr. Paul H. Hughes.

Hughes informed the ADA-*Washington Post* crowd, and they drank it all in, savoring every drop, that Senator McCarthy maintained an arsenal in the basement of the Senate Office Building—consisting of Lugers, revolvers, pistols, sub-machine guns and other weapons—against the day, presumably, when McCarthy would stage his Putsch. (Imagine what would have happened if Hughes had tried to convince Joe Rauh, or Alan Barth, or Murray Marder, or Alfred Friendly, or Telford Taylor, or James Wiggins, or Clayton Fritchie that the Communists were maintaining any such arsenal! He would have been laughed out of Washington!)

When the *Post's* ace newspaperman finally caught on, literally months after Hughes had initiated his profitable hoax, a series of events pitted Hughes against his old benefactors. When the Justice Department approached him for information on Harvey Matusow, he swore before a grand jury that the ADA had been instrumental in persuading Matusow to renounce his former testimony against various Communists, and that Rauh had known he was not on the level even when he continued to pass along anti-McCarthy dirt to the *Post,* the Democrats, *et al.*

It is the contention of the United States, in the case of the *U.S. v. Hughes,* that the ADA did *not* egg Matusow on, and that Rauh *was* made a monkey out of by Hughes. The issue is being fought out in court.

We shall be asking about a hundred questions in the course of the next couple of weeks, having to do with this strange case, a case that the *New York Times* doesn't deem very important (it announced it, on the day it broke, on page 32). We feel rather differently on the subject as, we suppose, do Brother Rauh, the *Washington Post,* and the Democratic National Committee.

On the Brink

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has one trait that obviously disqualifies him for practical politics in an enlightened age. He cannot resist now and then calling things by their right names. A month ago, in a statement issued jointly by himself and the Foreign Minister of our good ally, Portugal, Mr. Dulles shamelessly referred to a four-century-old Portuguese colony as—we blush to have to print it—

"a Portuguese colony." If this sort of thing keeps on, we'll end up calling a Negro a Negro and a fact a fact—barbarisms abandoned some years back by such central organs of our scientific enlightenment as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post and Times-Herald.*

Still more recently, Mr. Dulles had the effrontery to suggest, in the already famous *Life* article, that our nation has several times of late years come to the verge of war, and that in his opinion this was necessary and proper: "Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost."

Mr. Dulles' words evoked a Liberal howl heard 'round the world, echoing from Nehru in New Delhi to Adlai Stevenson in Chicago. The Secretary of State overnight became Target No. 1, alike for the *Daily Worker* and the Liberal machine.

There is no doubt that Mr. Dulles' crime is capital. At one blow of home truths he has murdered the most cherished of the sentimental delusions of the Liberal hierarchs: the dogma that "in a nuclear age war is unthinkable." The fact of course was, and is, that in a nuclear age (which happens also to be the age of the attempt of a new kind of revolutionary enterprise to seize a monopoly of world power) war, though more terrible in prospect than ever in the past, is terribly thinkable; and the urgent subject of the thoughts of every responsible statesman and military leader. What danger has ever been well met by shutting the mind's eye?

Let us rephrase Mr. Dulles' assertion. A nation that is not ready to risk war in defense of what it holds to be its vital interests is ripe for national death. This does not mean that the nation must actually and inevitably *go* to war to defend its vital interests; but it must be *ready* to go, if no other defense is possible. Indeed, what Mr. Dulles argues in the *Life* article is that it will contribute to the maintenance of peace if the aggressor nation clearly understands (and understands in advance) that we *will* fight, if necessary. At the least, this advance knowledge will prevent a war's starting by miscalculation on the aggressor's part; as, Mr. Dulles suggests, World War Two may well have started.

We confess to a certain uneasiness at Mr. Dulles' account of past history, in particular of the three occasions (Korea, Indochina, Quemoy-Matsu) when, according to the *Life* article, the Secretary of State steered the nation successfully up to, and thereby back from, "the brink." This present interpretation differs considerably (by what was *not* said as well as what *was* said) from what we had previously been allowed to believe. Moreover, on at least two of the three occasions, we drove "to the verge of general war" in order to achieve palpable defeat. And there is no point in risking war in order to assure defeat.

However faulty as narratives of the past, we'd like to belive that Mr. Dulles' statements can be correctly understood as resolutions for the future. "The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing. . . . Retaliation must be on a selective basis. The important thing is that the aggressor know in advance that he is going to lose more than he can win. . . . [The U. S.] wants and expects liberation to occur."

If Mr. Dulles means these things, and if he speaks for the Administration in meaning them, then there are better days ahead.

Watching the Watchers

The President has announced the appointment of an eight-man board to observe and appraise the conduct of the Central Intelligence Agency. The individuals named are distinguished: either as former military men (Admiral Conolly, Generals Doolittle and John E. Hull) or as industrial leaders, for the most part with previous government experience (Benjamin F. Fairless of U. S. Steel, Edward L. Ryerson of Inland Steel, Joseph P. Kennedy and Robert A. Lovett). James R. Killian, Jr., president of MIT, will act as chairman. If they were able to devote much time to their new assignment, which they will not be (the work will be done by a staff, no doubt planted on them by CIA itself), they would probably be able to come up with some sensible proposals. Certainly it is within the province of the President to ask a commission of this kind to help him in his job of supervising an executive agency.

Unfortunately, however, this new executive commission does little to answer the really significant constitutional and practical problems that have been raised in connection with CIA. By our Constitution, the power of the purse is exclusively vested in the Congress. A clause of the Constitution explicitly provides: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."

Now the fact is that Congress has no idea how much money CIA receives (estimated by some at well over a billion dollars annually), and has, as things stand, no control or check whatever on how the money is spent. There is ample reason to believe that much of it is spent very badly, and some of it illegally. CIA is prohibited by law from operating

within the United States (internal security being entrusted to the FBI), but CIA has not accepted this limitation. Its intelligence record is, at a most generous estimate, spotty. Many of its ventures in political warfare have been catastrophic.

The basic problem, then, is for Congress to attain its proper constitutional position with respect to CIA without jeopardizing the secrecy and security which CIA's mission—unavoidable in an age such as ours—must have. Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana has long been pressing for congressional enactment of a bill that would set up a carefully chosen small Joint Committee of the Senate and the House on CIA. This bill has been drawn after careful study and consultation. It seems to be the correct solution, or at least the framework for a solution. It was introduced in the last session, and will come up for hearings this month. We hope that the President's appointment of an executive board was not a mere maneuver to head off Senator Mansfield's bill, which deserves Congress' most urgent attention.

The Yalta Mess

Three weeks ago, the State Department got around to releasing bound volumes of Yalta papers. In an attempt to quiet charges that the compilation, as leaked to the *Times* last month, was tendentious and expurgated, additional documents were released.

But what were the Department's standards in determining what papers qualified for inclusion in this particular collection? The aim could not have been to limit the material to heretofore unpublished documents; for at least one document was published by the Department years ago. Small talk among the great is not necessarily excluded: there is much of it here, of one kind or another, and much excluded—for example, FDR's offer to turn over six million American Jews to Ibn Saud.

Nor is the collection limited chronologically to the day the Yalta conference ended; for it includes a a stiff note from FDR to Stalin written as late as April 7—months after the conference ended—and calculated, with an obviousness almost excruciating, to photograph FDR in one of his infrequent lapses into impatience with the Soviet Union. Nor does the compilation pretend to give a complete picture of relevant Yalta documents, public and nonpublic; else the compilers would not have left out Roosevelt's report to a joint session of Congress—in which, among other things, he told Congress, a few short days after offering Stalin crucial concessions in Manchuria, China and the Kurile Islands, that the Far East had not even been discussed at Yalta.

The evidence mounts that the State Department has edited this compilation in loving memory of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Perhaps some day the Department will sponsor another collection of documents—in loving memory of millions of dead Poles and Chinese.

Ridgway Speaks Up

In an article in the *Saturday Evening Post,* General Matthew B. Ridgway makes one of the gravest accusations a soldier can make against his Commander-in-Chief.

Among other things, the former Army Chief of Staff accuses Mr. Eisenhower of untruthfulness. He quotes from Mr. Eisenhower's State of the Union message of 1954 in which the President said the 1955 military budget was "based on a new military program unanimously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Not so, asserts General Ridgway. "As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who most emphatically had not concurred in the 1955 military program as it was presented to the people, I was nonplussed by this statement."

The situation is scandalous. When a President reports to Congress the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters that affect the national security, one rules out the possibility that the President "misunderstood" the position of so crucial a member of the Joint Chiefs as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Two congressional committees have announced their intention to get to the bottom of the thing. It is presumably the ambition of Congress to learn as much about what goes on in government as is known to the editors of the slick magazines.

The Gas Controversy

The debate on the Fulbright-Harris Bill grows more and more heated, and the basis for opposing the bill grows more palpably demagogic. Drew Pearson has thundered a warning that, if Democratic votes enact the gas bill, the Democrats will lose the coming election (no less); for they will have become partners in the Republicans' "giveaway" policy—the policy of ravishing our natural resources in behalf of the vested interests.

A number of Democrats will vote against the bill. And so, unfortunately, will a number of Republicans, e.g., Senators Potter, Purtell, and Wylie—and for reasons sad to contemplate. It is also regrettable that, although the President will predictably sign the bill, he has not urged it as vigorously as he might.

What is it all about? In 1938, the Natural Gas Act gave to the federal government the power to regulate the rates charged by interstate pipeline carriers for

shipping gas from state to state. Congress reasoned that the gas-line owners were operating a legalized monopoly and that, under the circumstances, the government has the same responsibility to exercise supervision as it has with respect to other such monopolies, e.g., telephones and railroads.

It is a matter of record that the Congress which passed this Act did *not* intend to give the government the power to fix the rate which independent gas producers could charge the pipeline carriers. That regulation was left to competition, and competition did the job for a period of sixteen years. But in 1954 the Supreme Court ruled arbitrarily and officiously, in the Phillips Case, that the 1938 Gas Act in effect charged the government with the responsibility of regulating the wellhead price. The Fulbright-Harris Bill would formally strip the government of a power the Congress never intended it to have.

What, then, is the point the opponents of the bill are trying to make? Well, among other things they imply that the production of natural gas is in effect a monopoly because the nation's supply of natural gas is owned by a very few people. But the figures are there to disprove this contention: there are eight thousand owners of producing wells in the U.S. today. Of the 453 separate manufacturing industries considered standard in our economy, no less than 382 have a *higher* concentration of ownership than does natural gas production.

It is being said that, before the government stepped in, there existed a more or less spontaneous conspiracy among owners of natural gas to charge an exorbitant price for gas. If that is the case, then the conspiracy was either ineffective, or else very public-spirited. The over-all cost of living has risen 50 per cent since 1945, food has risen 65.2 per cent, clothing 36 per cent, and rents 41 per cent, but the cost of gas has gone up only 12 per cent.

Opponents of the bill have pointed to the enormous profits made by individual gas owners. In some cases the profits have been very large indeed. Large profits —and catastrophic losses—are inherent in the nature of the gas and oil business. If one bets on a hundred-to-one shot, and it comes in, one expects to be paid a hundred to one. From 1938 until 1953, 84,000 wildcat wells were drilled. Of these, 74,000 were dry holes. With such statistics on the record, no entrepreneur will risk large sums of money to explore for oil or gas unless he is assured of a handsome return in the unlikely event he should hit. The *over-all* return on the dollar invested in oil and gas exploration is about the same as on the dollar invested in any other industry.

Finally, opponents of the bill contend that to return the price of gas to the free market threatens economic disaster for the consumer. Senator Douglas, sometime professor of economics, warned that passage of the bill would cost the consumers an extra six hundred million dollars yearly. Senator Douglas' reasoning was childishly disingenuous. "This sort of mathematical contortion," Senator Fulbright commented, "is—*as it is meant to be*—enough to frighten reason out of any discussion of this issue." The fact is that approximately ninety cents out of every dollar paid by the consumer for natural gas goes to pipeline carriers and local distributors, and only ten cents goes to pay for the gas itself. "As the facts show," said Senator Fulbright, "the producer's price is the least important factor in the consumer's gas bill. If the federal government should assume control over that price, the maximum benefit in dollars and cents to the consumer would be negligible even if the field price were arbitrarily reduced to zero." By the same token, the additional cost to the consumer would be negligible if the field price were arbitrarily *doubled;* yet no observer predicts the price will double, or anything like it, if the Fulbright-Harris Bill is passed.

There is no substantial case, in short, for giving the federal government the power to regulate the field price of natural gas. "Regulating the price at which the independent producer can sell his gas regulates his business in the most vital way any business can be regulated," wrote a dissenting Supreme Court justice in the Phillips decision. He is correct. The case for regulating gas is not substantially different from the case that could be made for government regulation of the price of steel, coal, oil, automobiles and canned tomatoes. A defeat for the bill would signify the triumph either of demagoguery, or of doctrinaire socialism.

Election-Year Appeasement

Since 1949, farm income has dropped from $11.7 billion to an estimated $9.5 billion. The hardest hit have been the million small farmers unable to buy machinery and modernize their farming methods. These million farmers think they have been swindled by Washington. Washington promised them a stable farm income, and it hasn't delivered. The Administration's soil bank program, and the Democrats' 90 per cent parity plan, are attempts to stave off their wrath at least until after November.

There are 2,100,000 operators of large mechanized farms whose feelings about government support are ambiguous. They see the small, inefficient farmer as an important cause of the present $7.7 billion farm surplus, and would like Washington to move in on him. The politicians, however, will take the small farmer's side, even though large farmers outnumber small farmers by two to one. An occupational failing of politicians is to appease belligerent minorities.

The Liberal Line...

WILLMOORE KENDALL

For some time now the Liberal propaganda machine has been all dressed up and no place to go. It has no foreign policy to sell. It has no candidate for President, either to boom or beat. It has no current levelling mission: the great live issue on the levelling front —can the white Southerners circumvent last year's judicial ukase for desegregation in the public schools? —is clearly one on which propaganda is wasted (since Supreme Court justices can, nowadays, be counted on to propagandize themselves). Even the Gray plan, therefore, hasn't given the machine any place to wear its Sunday clothes. In other words the machine, for lack of practice, is on the point of forgetting what it is to be really mobilized behind something. And everyone knows a machine rusts when it stands too long unused.

The Eastland Committee's unprovoked attack on the lowly *New York Times* has, happily, now provided an opportunity for a major workout, in which every ounce of energy expended has gone into one or another of two of the machine's highest-priority long-term operations. Namely: 1) inhibiting effective exposure of the scope and character of Communist infiltration of basic American institutions, and 2) undermining the power and prestige of Congress.

The propaganda directive on the Eastland Committee, as far as the first of these operations is concerned, is more or less this: As to the question whether there was Communist infiltration of the *Times*, enter a demurrer. Take your tack from Marlowe: that was in another epoch, and besides, the wench is dead. Whether some Communists maneuvered themselves into the *Times* 'way back when simply doesn't matter. Be careful, however, not to commit the machine on the course it would follow if similar facts came to light about, e.g., Fascist infiltration of American newspapers. We must maintain a flexible position.

As frequently happens, the most impudent statement of the position was the *Washington Post's*. An "honorable and respected newspaperman," it asserts, was a Communist Party member from 1937-39—because of "misguided idealism." He is now compelled to "confess in public a political aim of which he was guilty for a brief period nearly 20 years ago"; "What public purpose," asks the *Post*, "was served . . . in humiliating and abasing this man? Is there not a right of privacy for past political errors . . . ? What legitimate interest can the Senate . . . have in the disclosure of this long-expiated and long-buried nugget of personal shame?"

In pursuit of its intention to discredit Congress, the Liberal directive is: Ignore the fact that an attempt by Congress to lay bare the workings of the underground Communist movement makes no sense if Congress is forbidden to investigate an institution simply because it cannot pass laws regulating it. Our tack is that any congressional investigation whose findings lead it into the newspaper world ceases to be what it has been up to then, and becomes first and foremost an investigation of the press; that Congress can investigate only that which it can legislate about; that Congress under the First Amendment cannot legislate about the press; that, therefore, it cannot investigate the press, no matter what reasons it advances for doing so. Lower echelons are instructed, however, merely to assert these points, and let it go at that; only the highest are to regard themselves as free to argue it—and even they, with due care not to put the case too strongly. We must not go so far in asserting this position as to make it possible for someone to infer that the *New York Times* should maintain its own fire-fighting equipment, since any incursions by the Fire Department would constitute government interference with the press, and thus violate the First Amendment. Let us, in any event, try to dispose once and for all of the idea that Congress is empowered to help newspaper publishers identify persons on their staffs who may still be Communists. *All* echelons are to avoid the question whether the *Times'* weekly book-section has clearly been dominated until a recent date by persons who, whatever their motives in doing so, used it to kill off effective anti-Communist books. The whole topic, from our point of view, is unprofitable.

Here the honors for impudence clearly go to Mr. Lippmann, whose argument runs in effect as follows: The committee has shown that over the past twenty years the *Times* has employed an "insignificant percentage" of persons who "have at one time or another been Communists." None of these persons, however, had authority enough to "exercise any discernible influence upon the news or opinions of the newspaper"; no evidence that they did so has been brought to light; obviously, therefore, there is no such evidence. The real question, in any case, is whether Congress has the power to investigate the press, and, if so, what are the limits on that power, and does it include the power to "censor" individual newspaper employers? A clear answer to this question is not to be found in any court decision, but one can be arrived at by the following simple logic: The First Amendment would be "deeply impaired" if Congress, by direct enactment, "set up standards of newspaper employment." Clearly, therefore, it can make no such enactment. Equally, however, it cannot set up such standards by indirection. Now: the power to investigate combines the power "to make laws [!], to enforce those laws [!!], to judge and punish men under these laws [!!!]." And if it became "the accepted practice that Congress may investigate the press, machinery would exist to nullify the First Amendment." The newspaper profession—the newspaper profession, mind you—must never, therefore, assent to the claim that Congress has "the power to investigate the editorial management [!] of newspapers."

Impudence? Well, brother, what do *you* think of someone's trotting out the axiom—the keystone of Mr. Lippmann's arch—that the power to investigate, always exercised by mere committees of Congress, combines Congress' power to make laws, the Executive's power to enforce laws, and the Court's power to judge and to punish men under those laws?

Walter Lippmann: Defeatist

The nation's self-elected mentor has succeeded in blinding a large public to the fact that he is often wrong and always defeatist

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Walter Lippmann, avoiding debate on the platform or in print, has set himself up as a permanent nonpartisan counsellor to the nation, on national and international affairs. He knows everything, understands everything, foresees everything. No, Lippmann is not the kind of person who would sign a Communist-front manifesto or share a platform with the Dean of Canterbury. From the Fabian socialism of his Harvard student days he has evolved, in his thinking on public affairs, into a very diluted and ultra-moderate conservatism. But on the biggest international issue of our time he has been a consistent defeatist—on the issue of the Communist grand design to conquer the world by a mixture of force and subversive propaganda.

Lippmann is by no means consistent. He has been known to oscillate between extremes of optimism and pessimism after trips to Europe. (A Washington hostess with a gift of tossing off epigrams once referred to The Pundit as "Operation Cross-eyed." One of her other designations was "The hillbilly Polonius" for Cordell Hull.) But on not being beastly to the Kremlin, and on taking a very dim view of those who believe that there ought to be a fighting spirit even in a cold war, his line has been straight and undeviating. One need only look up the record.

Predictions Gone Askew

In 1944, when the defeat of the Axis powers was already assured, Lippmann published a book, *U.S. War Aims* (Little Brown and Atlantic Monthly Press)—profitable reading today for anyone who regards Lippmann as an inspired seer of things to come. The book fairly bristles with predictions that have gone woefully askew, and with policy recommendations that would have led to most disastrous consequences if they had been followed.

Here are some specimens of false predictions:

> The conclusive defeat of Japan will make the United States and the whole Atlantic Community invulnerably secure in the Pacific; the conclusive defeat of Germany will make Western Europe and the Americas secure. [p. 91]
>
> Only uncritical speculation can suppose that air forces based on Russian and on American soil could in the foreseeable future be capable of deciding a Russian-American conflict. [p. 134]
>
> Russia could take Germany into her camp much more quickly than we could take Germany into ours . . . National Socialist Germany could rather easily become Soviet Germany. [p. 118]

(A commentary on this cocksure preview of postwar Germany: the two German national elections held in conditions of freedom resulted in overwhelming repudiation both of National Socialism and of Communism.)

Owen Lattimore is referred to (p. 92) as "a tried and true friend of China," and there is an obvious indebtedness of Lippmann to Lattimore's writings on the Far East.

Unsatisfactory as the state of the world is in this year 1956, it would have been far worse if two of Lippmann's suggestions had been put into practice:

"The Chinese," he writes (p. 105) "should be the judges of Allied policy toward the [Japanese] Emperor, they should be the judges of the length and character of the occupation of Japan, and they should be the principals in carrying out what is decided."

And he writes (on p. 116) a parallel recommendation for Germany:

"We shall be wise if we let the European peoples, who are the victims of Germany, and must yet live next to Germany, settle the moral and political accounts . . . They must live next to the Germans. Let Germany be judged by her peers. We are too far away to judge wisely and well."

The consequences of abdicating American responsibility in Japan to what is now a Communist China, and American responsibility in Germany to Germany's European neighbors (including presumably the countries behind the Iron Curtain) are too much to contemplate. Incidentally, the same idea of handing over Germany to the rule of its continental neighbors animated the notorious Morgenthau Plan, of which the Communist agent Harry Dexter White was the principal architect. The proposal is spelled out there as follows:

> The primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers . . . Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time.

It is not hard to imagine what would have been the result of subjecting Germany to an exclusively continental military occupation, in which the Soviet Union would have been the one first-rate military power.

U.S. War Aims was published in 1944, the year before Yalta. And in reading this book one understands why Lippmann has always been a zealous apologist for the betrayal of Poland and Nationalist China at Yalta. For Lippmann, disposing of the fate of nations as easily as if they were pawns on a chessboard, anticipated Yalta in this book. There, he affirms repeatedly that all Europe east of Germany must pass into a "Russian Orbit." "If the Soviet Union is to check Germany from the east," he writes (p. 128), "the military system of the central and eastern European states must be co-ordinated not

with Germany but with Russia." Such matters as the right of one hundred million East Europeans to independence from alien Communist rule, or the outrageous moral cynicism in turning over to Soviet rule the Poles who were fighting Nazism during the cordial relations between Hitler and Stalin, do not trouble him in the least.

We have no business, he asserts, to raise a voice for any country included within this very broad and generous Russian orbit. Lippmann does not go so far as to make the Soviet Union a present of Germany (although his proposal to leave Germany to the "judgment" of its European neighbors would most probably have led to this result). But he warns repeatedly that the U.S. must not think in terms of acquiring Germany and Japan as allies against the Soviet Union. Stalin, and Stalin's heirs, could have been well satisfied with Lippmann's blueprint for the postwar world — a Soviet Empire stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific, and a neutralized Germany and Japan. A Soviet Empire far exceeding in population, territory and natural resources anything achieved by the Tsars, plus the emasculation of the two powers which are natural checks on Russian expansion in Europe and Asia, was all the Kremlin could possibly want as its reward in 1945.

It is suggestive of the moral myopia (and the astigmatism as regards America's national interests) which prevailed during the war years that Lippmann's book elicited very little adverse criticism. Nor did a piece of singularly inaccurate history and weak political reasoning which he presented in 1944 as an argument for the permanence of the wartime coalition:

> It is easy to say, but it is not true, that the Allies of today may be the enemies of tomorrow. . . . Our present alliance against Germany is no temporary contraption. It is an alignment of nations which, despite many disputes, much suspicion and even short and local wars, like the Crimean, have for more than a century been natural allies.
>
> It is not a coincidence that Britain and Russia have found themselves allies ever since the rise of German imperial aggression, that the United States and Russia, under the Tsars and under the Soviets, have always in vital matters been on the same side.

This is an almost inconceivable distortion of historical facts—to support a prediction that has been most emphatically disproved by events. Great Britain and Russia, far from having been "allied ever since the rise of German imperial aggression," were on extremely bad terms for more than two decades after the Bolshevik Revolution. The United States and Russia have by no means "always been on the same side in vital matters." American popular sympathy and diplomatic support were for Japan, not for Russia, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. America and Russia repeatedly came into conflict over the Russian "closed door" policy in Manchuria, and readily accessible history books record many outspokenly unfavorable comments on Russian diplomatic aims and methods by Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay.

All this scrambled history was invoked to justify a prediction that flew in the face of all historical probability. For it is an almost unfailing experience that military coalitions are formed against what seems to be an immediate danger, and that they fall apart as soon as this danger has disappeared—and given way to new dangers. This is, of course, precisely what happened after the Second World War. And the insatiable nature of imperialist Soviet Communism made this development, a probability in any case, a virtual certainty for any shrewd analyst.

Cassandra Gloom

Walter Lippmann's next book on international affairs was a short pamphlet, entitled *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Harper and Brothers, 1947). It was published after the so-called Truman Doctrine had been announced, after the U.S. Congress had voted economic and military help to Greece and Turkey, and after the policy of "containment" had been more or less officially adopted.

Lippmann's pamphlet was a bitter, sustained criticism of this policy of "containment." There was certainly a basis for criticism in the fact that this policy was negative and defensive; that it left the initiative to Moscow; that it tacitly accepted the existing division of the world, holding out to the peoples enslaved by Communism only the vague hope that some day Communism would mellow or break up from within. Perhaps the ultimate absurdity of "containment" was the order, issued early in the Korean War (and quickly cancelled), that American planes bomb no targets in North Korea.

But Lippmann attacked "containment" for exactly the wrong reasons—not for being too little, but for being too much. "The instrument of the policy of containment," he warns in the tragic Cassandra tone which is invoked whenever he discusses any scheme for resisting Soviet aggression, "is therefore a coalition of disorganized, disunited, feeble or disorderly nations, tribes and factions around the perimeter of the Soviet Union."

The policy of "containment" must fail, he insists, not because it is too limited and negative, but because it is a provocation which the Soviet Government is certain to frustrate. With the double Cassandra gloom which is Lippmann's routine reaction to any plan for setting a limit to Communist expansion, he sees us losing Europe, losing allies, losing almost everything, if we interpose a firm No (backed with guns and dollars) to Soviet designs in Iran, Turkey and Greece. His defeatist creed is proclaimed on page 27:

> Either Russia will burst through the barriers which are supposed to contain her, and all of Europe will be at her mercy, or, at some point and at some time, the diplomatic war will become a full scale shooting war. In either event Europe is lost. Either Europe falls under the domination of Russia, or Europe becomes the battlefield of a Russian-American war.
>
> Because the policy of containment offers these intolerable alternatives to our old allies, the real aim of every European nation, including Great Britain, is to extricate itself from the Russian-American conflict. While we have been devoting our energies to lining up and bolstering up the Chinese Nationalists, the Iranians, the Turks, the Greek monarchists and conservatives, the anti-Soviet Hungarians, Rumanians and Poles, the natural alignment of the British, French, Belgians, Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavians has been weakened. . . .
>
> The aim of the leading democratic states of Europe and probably also of the Americas is at best to hold the balance of power between Russia and America, and thus to become mediators of that conflict. At worst their aim is to isolate themselves in some kind of neutrality which will spare them the dual catastrophe of being overrun by the Red Army and bombed by the American air forces.

Compare this piece of defeatist analysis with the realities of 1947—and of 1956. There is certainly an element of unconscious irony in stating that an Administration whose foreign af-

fairs were first in the hands of General George C. Marshall, and then of Dean Acheson, was devoting great energy to "bolstering up" Chinese Nationalists and Poles and other subjugated peoples behind the Iron Curtain. It is also a most improbable assumption that, if the United States had continued on the Yalta road, throwing West Berliners, Turks, Greeks, Iranians and Koreans to the Soviet wolves, there would have been a rally of the West European powers to our leadership, as Mr. Lippmann naively asserts.

Cowardice inspires cowardice and courage inspires courage. It was the temporary shift in American policy from appeasement of Communism to resistance to Communist expansion (even though this resistance was too passive, too limited in scope and conception) that made possible things never dreamed of—things like NATO, American air bases in Great Britain, the German Federal Republic as an armed ally of the West, and armed forces (even though token forces) of Great Britain, France, Greece, Turkey and other powers fighting in Korea.

Consciously or unconsciously, Lippmann in this and in many other of his writings equates the mood of the British and French peoples with the sentiments of such "neutralist" publications as the *New Statesman* and *Le Monde*. He swallows another hoax of the coexistence theorists when he writes (*The Cold War*, p. 56):

> The economic interdependence of Western and Eastern Europe will compel the nations of the continent to exchange their goods across the military, political and ideological boundary lines which now separate them . . . . They [the West European countries] must revive their trade with the agricultural regions of Eastern Europe and with European Russia. If they do not do that, the cost of maintaining a tolerable standard of life in Western Europe will be exorbitant. . . .

There has, of course, been no such revival of East-West trade, and for a very good reason: Communist rule has dried up the former agricultural surpluses of Eastern Europe. Yet the countries of Western Europe are enjoying high prosperity, and they are less dependent on U.S. subsidies than at any time since the war.

Close to the Nehru Line

This failure to do adequate homework before sounding off with very positive predictions is characteristic of Lippmann. In his discussions of the possibility that the German Federal Republic might shift to an Eastern (or at least a "neutralist") position he has seldom, if ever, mentioned one of the most significant of postwar figures—the two million Germans who have fled (in most cases abandoning all their property) from Soviet-controlled Germany to West Germany, from socialism to capitalism, from slavery to freedom. This simple fact is the best inoculation for the West Germans against any temptation to "reunion" without freedom.

Lippmann's fundamental defeatism has not changed during the subsequent vicissitudes of the cold war. He hewed pretty close to the Nehru line during the war in Korea. It required little imagination to sense satisfaction in his comments as the unnatural combination of French Communists and French extreme nationalists obstructed, and finally defeated, what had been originally a French proposal —the European Defense Community.

Characteristic of his attitude is his designation (in his column of December 1, 1955) as "mistakes" of the three following steps in American policy:

"The premature attempt to rearm Germany in 1950. . . . The irreparable mistake of crossing the 38th Parallel in Korea. . . . The over-militarization of the containment policy which has jeopardized our relations with India and several other uncommitted nations."

It is doubtful whether a single military authority, in the U.S. or in any other country, believes that Western Europe can be safeguarded without a substantial contribution from the German Federal Republic. How strange, therefore, to designate as "premature" an attempt to enlist Germany as an ally which began in 1950, bogged down for years in French obstruction, and for months in petty politics in the German Bundestag, and that has yet to put a single German division in the field! If there has been a mistake in preparing German rearmament, it was not to have pressed it earlier, harder and more effectively. And, of course, the mistake in Korea was not the attempt to end the Communist aggression swiftly and decisively by crossing the 38th Parallel. The mistake was in not replying to the Chinese Communist attack with American air power against military targets not only in North Korea but in Red China proper.

To speak of "over-militarization" in connection with American defense agreements with countries threatened by Soviet aggression is quaint. Is it reasonable, in view of the known balance of military force, to suppose that Soviet statesmen are lying awake nights fearing that Turkey may attack the Caucasus, or that Iran will mount an invasion of Soviet Central Asia?

And, as the only apparent means of satisfying Nehru would be to surrender unconditionally to Communism, the probability is that we shall have to leave him unsatisfied.

In his columns of November 10 and 15 Mr. Lippmann, with his usual self-assured dogmatism, takes Mr. Dulles to task for his firm insistence on German reunion in freedom and announces that, if we will not negotiate with the Soviet puppet regime in the Soviet Zone, "the Germans themselves will negotiate under the table." They will do this, he warns, "with our support if that is possible, without our support if it is necessary."

There is no effort to explain what an *unarmed* German Federal Republic could hope to obtain in "negotiation" from a mighty Soviet military empire. The true alternative for Germany has been set forth by a veteran German diplomat, Gustav Hilger, who was Counsellor of the German Embassy in Moscow between the two wars, in his memoirs, *The Incompatible Allies* (Macmillan, 1953, p. 342):

> Only two alternatives are open to her [Germany]. She can either seek security against the Soviet threat by an alliance with the Western powers, or else she can ally herself with the Soviet Union. But in the event of the latter Western Germany, and probably the rest of Europe, would doubtless share the fate of the East European satellites.

Walter Lippmann's views on foreign affairs are of more than ordinary concern to our public opinion because he has made himself a part of what some British call The Establishment: he is often regarded, on both sides of the Atlantic, as a kind of unofficial Voice of America. His record, stated in Mr. Lippmann's own words, shows a consistent defeatism about America's prospects in the struggle against Communist imperialism. From the time he was prepared to write off all the peoples east of Germany, as a Soviet "orbit" or sphere of influence, up to his column of December 15, 1955, in which he envisages the expulsion of Nationalist China from the United Nations, Lippmann's thinking on international affairs has been determined by this defeatism. If American public opinion is still inclined to deem him a prophet and seer, in spite of this persistent bias and his numerous false prophecies, it will do so at its own peril.

ON THE LEFT . . . C. B. R.

Cominform Revived. Last September there were reports from Moscow that the Cominform (formerly the Communist International) was to be disbanded. During their recent Indian visit, however, Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin and Russian Communist Party chief Nikita S. Khrushchev announced that the Cominform would be maintained. It is not surprising, therefore, that the American Communist Party, along with thirty-two other foreign Communist parties, was represented at the second congress of the Rumanian Workers (Communist) Party held in Belgrade in December. Present along with the American observers were General Chu Teh, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Government; Matyas Rakosi, Premier of Hungary; Tudor Zhikov, first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party; Giovanni Roveda of the Italian Communist Party; Senora Dolores Ibarruri (La Passionaria) of the Spanish Communist Party; Vaclav Kopecky, Deputy Premier of Czechoslovakia; and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party. American Reds certainly mingled with the international Big Shots, but how did they get their passports, if any?

Storm Center. *Chapter I.* On May 21, 1953 Mary Knowles, a librarian at Norwood, Mass., appeared before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and invoked the Fifth Amendment in regard to her present membership in the Communist Party. *Chapter II.* In October 1953 Mrs. Knowles was employed as a librarian at the William Jeanes Memorial Library at Plymouth Meeting, Pa. *Chapter III.* In November 1953 the Fund for the Republic granted the library $5,000 for its "courageous and effective defense of democratic principles" in employing Mrs. Knowles. To date the library has refused to accept the award. *Chapter IV.* On September 15, 1955 Mrs. Knowles appeared before the same congressional committee and denied present membership in the Communist Party, but challenged the committee's authority to ask about her past membership and refused to answer. *Chapter V.* Columbia Pictures produced a film entitled "Storm Center," featuring Bette Davis as Alice Hull, a librarian and childless widow of a soldier who died at Chateau Thierry (Mr. Knowles was in fact a well-known Massachusetts Communist). Asked to remove from the shelves a book entitled *The Communist Dream*, she refuses and is fired. Freddie Slater, "the brightest boy in town," enters the library one night on a search for Communist books and starts a fire which destroys the library. Freddie is saved. The repentant townspeople plead with Alice Hull to help them rebuild the library.

Collectivism on the Campus. Yuri Suhl, a writer for Communist publications, was invited to speak before the students of the University of Rochester by the program committee of the College Congress. Suhl made an impassioned plea for Morton Sobell, imprisoned atomic spy.

Telford Taylor vs. National Review. This paper has been honored by the so-called National Committee for an Effective Congress. An appeal for funds, signed by Telford Taylor, asks for financial aid to combat the nefarious designs of "the new, well-heeled publication, NATIONAL REVIEW." When he was chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, Taylor was charged publicly by Senator Langer with maintaining a staff "composed of leftists and men who have since been exposed as Communists and members of Communist front organizations." At the same time Representative George Dondero charged that Taylor's staff was "loaded with Communists and fellow travellers." Justice Curtis Shake of the Indiana Supreme Court accused Taylor and his staff of hasty and ill-conceived action in threatening witnesses and engaging in unauthorized searches. Dr. Theophil Wurm, German Protestant Bishop, stated that Taylor's prosecuting staff employed "criminal methods and abominable tortures to obtain testimony and confessions." The same charge was repeated by Judge E. Van Roden of Pennsylvania. The *Daily Worker* of May 11, 1947, insisted that Taylor was an "honest prosecutor."

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

Senator Knowland intends to strike out for the nomination after February 15, if by that time the President has not definitely declared himself to be a candidate. The Californian suspects that the White House may, even after Mr. Eisenhower's medical examination, postpone disclosure of the President's plans. And this, he believes, would be carrying the game too far. It would then be difficult to discount the argument that the President has become a party to a plan to deny the electorate an opportunity to choose between right and left-wing Republicans. Accordingly, he would file in the California, Oregon, New Jersey and Maryland primaries.

Knowland will be dissuaded from this plan only by evidence that White House strategy has, by mid-February, destroyed any chance of mounting a successful campaign. Very possibly, however, the President's delay has already ruined his chances.

For one thing, the inchoate conservative coalition described in this column last fall (November 19) has now disintegrated. Its members, with the possible exception of Senator Dirksen, still support Knowland. But they will not, as organization men had urged them to do, join forces with him in the primary campaign. Dirksen has chosen to concentrate on his Senate race in Illinois. Bricker will head a favorite son delegation, but as a free agent. McCarthy has definitely decided not to enter the Wisconsin or other primaries, even though straw polls in his home state put him far ahead of his likely opponent—the Eisenhower-pledged favorite son candidate, Governor Kohler. Senator Bridges has, as everyone knows, been successfully finessed in New Hampshire.

For another thing, it has been virtually impossible for Senator Knowland to raise money, or to begin building a campaign organization. And as long as Eisenhower refuses to declare himself, Knowland will continue to have a hard time finding financial backers or politicians who will risk appearing to support a rebellion against the Administration.

But Knowland's tormentors have their own troubles. It is true, as Mr. Roscoe Drummond suggests in *Collier's*, that some members of the Inner Circle are trying to sell Mr. Eisenhower on the "two-President" plan as the answer to his and their dilemma. The function of President No. 1 would be to decorate the Republican ticket with the name of Dwight Eisenhower. President No. 2, the ostensible Vice President, would bear the main burdens of the office, and take over in the Liberal Republican tradition, in the event of the President's retirement or death.

The stumbling block to the two-President plan, perhaps an insurmountable one, is Mr. Nixon. Many of the Palace Guard doubt that Nixon, *as President No. 1,* could be trusted to carry on the Liberal tradition, or for that matter, to keep *them* on the payroll. Moreover, Mr. Nixon would provide Democrats with precisely what they long for—an assailable personal target.

On the other hand, Nixon cannot be dropped from the ticket without giving the game away. The plan's success depends on the ability of Republicans to sell Mr. Eisenhower as a presently healthy man—good for at least four more Presidential years. Nothing could more effectively advertise *doubts* about the President's health than a decision to depart from the tradition of renominating the incumbent Vice President.

Senator George's opposition to long-term foreign aid shook up the Liberals (said the *New York Times*: "he did not seem to be in his best form"). One of the staunchest champions of bipartisanship ("on most essentials of the bipartisan foreign policy," the *Times* reminds us, "Senator George has stood with the angels") declares against the major plank in the bipartisan platform, and for the reason that the plank endangers bipartisanship! Actually, however, George's prognosis is perfectly correct, and reveals the kind of political analysis-in-depth that has ended him up on the winning side in many battles.

Here is the way George sized up the future—on the assumption the Administration wins approval for its plan to make ten-year foreign aid commitments. In the unlikely event that a Republican occupies the White House in the years immediately ahead, Democrats will be in the position of having their major contribution to U.S. foreign policy dispensed by Republicans. Democrats in Congress would continue to support foreign aid, of course: what else could they do? But the program would be a Republican show, and, as memories dimmed of their original support of the enabling act, Democrats would find it increasingly difficult to claim their share of the credit.

But much more decisive in George's eyes: in the likely event that the Democrats capture the Presidency, Republican cooperation with a *Democratic* show would be easier to obtain without long-term commitments than with them. If a Democratic Administration assumes full responsibility for the U.S. foreign aid program, George reasons, strategic GOP Congressmen will predictably sit back and lob 16-inch shells in the direction of Mr. Eisenhower's successor. Republican criticism would be more difficult if Republican Congressmen annually authorize foreign aid expenditures, and sanction, in a general way, the distribution.

But can Republicans be counted on to continue to vote for foreign aid? Yes, George believes, that is predictable: Republicans, even most right-wingers, have a record of criticizing foreign aid and voting for it (more or less as requested) in the end.

This is what George meant by saying that long-term commitments "will not promote a continued bipartisan approach in Congress." Like the *Times*, George understands the importance of bipartisanship to long-range Liberal strategy. But unlike the *Times*, he realizes that bipartisanship is useful to the Liberals only to the extent that it produces a semblance of day-to-day conservative *participation* in their policies. Conservative participation may, at times, slow them down; but in the long pull it immobilizes the Opposition.

The Soviet Economic Potential

We here publish two comments on the Pyrrho article, "Can Moscow Deliver?" (NATIONAL REVIEW, *January 11*), *together with a further discussion by Pyrrho. It was Pyrrho's thesis that U.S. official estimates of the Soviet economic potential are grossly exaggerated, because of an uncritical use of statistics and a failure to relate abstract statistics to known material realities; that Soviet annual Gross National Product (GNP) is now in the range $60-$75 billion instead of the officially accepted figure of $135 billion; and that it is impossible for the Soviet economy to sustain a large foreign aid program.*

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1) From Colin Clark, Director of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute, Oxford:

[Pyrro has forgotten] that Soviet Russia added some 20 per cent to its national product just by annexing population and territory in 1945. He also refers to India as a very poor country with a national product of only $20 billion. This figure has apparently been obtained by converting the rupee at current exchange rates, but in fact its purchasing power is far higher than that. India is a poor country but not as poor as all that.

My own estimate of the current net national product of the Soviet Union, restated in terms of dollars in present day purchasing power, would be about $125 billion. If you want Gross National Product, a somewhat less scientific measure for purposes of comparison, you should add about $12 billion. I thus agree fairly closely with the estimate made for the Secretary of State by the statisticians in the State Department. My figure would include about $60 billion of personal consumption and about $25 billion of *net* new investment. In reviewing military expenditure we come up against some difficult statistical problems of definition, but it appears that Russia is maintaining forces which would cost $20-25 billion per annum, if they were paid at the same rate as the American servicemen. The remainder of the net national product represents public expenditure on health, education, etc. (I have tried to exclude expenditure on police and supervisory services.)

This net national product should be compared with the net national product of 1940 (including the annexed territories of Poland) of $75 billion, expressed at present day purchasing power; of $46 billion (for a smaller area) in 1928, and of $41 billion (for the 1928 area) in 1913. All these are expressed in dollars of present day purchasing power.

It is a particularly foolish game, played by many academic writers on this subject, to assume that because Russian real national product has shown a certain percentage per annum rate of increase over a period of a few years, that this increase must go on indefinitely. In fact, the rate of increase is almost certain to slow down. In my own opinion, the long period rate of increase of real national product in Russia will settle down to about 3 per cent per annum.

2) From an economist with particular qualifications on the relevant statistical problems:

I have very great distrust of international comparisons of output aggregates, unless they are very carefully qualified and explained. I have discovered that the index number problem, which is involved in such comparisons, is so powerful that it cannot be simply shrugged away. When output of a backward country is recomputed at prices of an advanced country, the result is bound to differ very substantially from the one that would be achieved by the opposite method, i.e., computing output of the advanced country at prices of the backward country. This is so because in the backward country, if it has a meaningful price system, the highly fabricated goods constitute a relatively low proportion of total output while their prices are relatively high in terms of low-fabricated goods.

When you recompute Russian output in dollars you assign a relatively high weight to low-fabricated goods, which are relatively expensive in the United States in terms of highly-fabricated goods. In this way, therefore, a *higher* share of the backward country's output in relation to that of the advanced country is obtained. The opposite is true of the rate of growth. If the rate of growth of Russian output is recomputed in dollars for a number of years, it should for the same reason yield a *lower* rate of growth than would emerge from an index based on the weights of any less advanced country. Thus, to my mind, any such figure, be it $135 billion or $75 billion, or a rate of 8 or 4 per cent, must be carefully qualified before it can carry much weight. . . .

It seemed to me that the author might want to distinguish between two things: 1) rate of growth, and 2) changes in levels of consumption. The two appear quite naturally conjoined in a free economy. They are not in Russian conditions. There, growth can proceed without anything like comparable improvements in the standard of living. In principle at least such a country can keep increasing the rate of investment while keeping per capita consumption constant or increasing it very slowly. *Ceteris paribus* this would mean that the *rate* of growth would tend to grow until it begins to approach assymptotically the capital output ratio. Now, there is, of course, no *ceteris paribus* and the author is right in stressing the retarding factors which must be at work within the Soviet body economic. But to some extent these retarding forces may be offset by the factor just mentioned, i.e., the growing rate of investment. Possibly, falling capital-output ratios might work in the same direction . . . .

A Further Discussion by Pyrrho

Mr. Colin Clark's conclusion regarding the rate of growth in Russian Gross National Product that may be anticipated over the coming years is in heartening contrast to the rate the U.S. officially assumes. His estimate of 3 per cent is less than half the minimum rate of 7 per cent implicit in U.S. official data.

I am, however, somewhat disturbed by his estimate of the share of personal consumption, which he places at 43.5

per cent of GNP. The share of personal consumption is undoubtedly small, but it seems extremely unlikely that it is less than 55 per cent, and it may well be more. The best academic estimates, after a variety of adjustments, are able to bring the share down only to 55 per cent (cf. Hoeffding's estimates for 1937). At the same time, it would appear that the $60 billion estimate for personal consumption is much larger than it should be. It may be that Mr. Clark has enlarged this factor by an amount not normally accounted in GNP estimates, i.e., real consumption arising from private effort.

The attribution of factors not normally accounted is presumably the reason for placing Indian GNP at a much higher level than is generally assumed. Practically, there is reason for doing this; but if it is done, then formal comparability disappears.

Expenditures Uncommon in USSR

Mr. Clark's objection to the use of unadjusted U.S. consumption figures is, of course, well taken if the criteria normally used in judging academic or formal comparability are determining. However, when using U.S. consumption figures, it is necessary to make certain adjustments for expenditures which are not common among Soviet citizens or represent a much smaller fraction of their total outlay. Among these are rent, religious and charitable contributions, personal services, foreign travel, and medical and dental outlay. It would, of course, be indefensible to assume that these factors represent the share of consumption in the USSR that they do in the U.S. I have accordingly made adjustments to put the figures on a comparable basis. The apparatus was omitted in the article, but the comparison is, I think, valid. In extenuation, I suggest that the tedious arithmetic of analysis that characterizes publication in academic journals is inappropriate in an article designed for general readers.

With Mr. Clark's estimate of Soviet GNP in the early Stalinist period, I differ. His estimate of 1928 Soviet product suggests a per capita product of more than $330 in current terms. This compares with the less than $100 now prevailing in many underdeveloped countries. I had thought $150 per capita a too generous estimate for Russia in the early thirties, especially in view of the terrible losses sustained in the collectivization of agriculture, which at that time represented nearly 50 per cent of total product.

The Problem of Quality

The main objection to Mr. Clark's comment lies, however, in his estimate of current Soviet GNP. This estimate may rest on reported Soviet output of basic commodities—coal, steel, oil, cement and timber—which according to 1954 Soviet statistics approximate one-third of U.S. output. There are two primary difficulties with a Soviet national product estimate that is validated by reference to claimed output of basic commodities. The first is that the statistics almost certainly overstate grossly the actual amount of output; the second is the problem of quality, availability of substitute materials, and efficient use.

Between 1950 and 1954, crude steel output in the USSR is reported to have increased 20 billion tons, or about the same amount as the increase in U.S. output between 1940 and 1948. During the period 1950 to 1954, Soviet cement output is reported to have increased nine million tons, an amount equal to the increase in U.S. output between 1940 and 1947. A little skepticism about such extraordinary claims seems warranted.

The problems of quality, availability of competing materials, and efficient use are of equal importance in estimates of Soviet production. Data on Soviet cement output are interesting, if true, but such data do not provide any index to the total availability of construction materials. Is there a cinder block industry in the USSR comparable in importance to that in the U.S.? What is Soviet output of clay and gypsum products, glass, light metals, and other building materials? How efficiently is the available cement used? In the U.S. there is some assurance that it is efficiently used while in the USSR, on Khrushchev's own admission during his visit to Yugoslavia, its use is notoriously wasteful.

The question is whether, even assuming for a moment that Soviet output of all construction materials is a third that of the U.S., they get a third the amount of construction. In the absence of complete data on construction we cannot know. But practical consideration of the problem certainly suggests that they get a great deal less. And, when architectural considerations are brought into the question, further downgrading seems appropriate.

On the problem of energy output, careful consideration suggests that the yield is relatively low compared with the U.S. Soviet railroads are estimated to consume as much as a third of all coal products. Coal is often transported a thousand miles—from the Kuznetsk basin to the Ural steel centers—much of the way uphill. Is natural gas efficiently used in the USSR, as increasingly it tends to be in the U.S., and how much is produced? In brief, Soviet data on fuel output may suggest that available energy approaches a fifth or a quarter that of the U.S.; but practical consideration of the matter does not.

Statistics and Reality

It may be true that if the Soviet basic commodity statistics are taken at face value and multiplied by a factor representing the relation of U.S. GNP to the value of U.S. output of the same basic commodities, the resulting figure for Soviet GNP would amount to a third that of the U.S. But this would be a pure statistical exercise and would not take account of the known factors of excessive waste, uneconomic location, bad quality, and non-availability of competing materials all of which so drastically affect Soviet production. In any case, such an exercise would give full credit to Soviet statistics on basic commodity output.

Accordingly, the simple statistical exercise involved in constructing formally comparable aggregates seems hardly appropriate in respect to the USSR. The resulting aggregate grossly overstates the real economic power of the USSR and, in particular, results in a wholly incredible estimate of rates of economic growth.

It was to this point that my recent article was directed. I suggested that a new start be made by a careful and systematic construction of personal consumption based on standards known to prevail in the USSR. The next stage would be to obtain some estimate of the appropriate degredation factors in respect of quality, availability of competing materials, and

(*Continued on p. 19*)



The THIRD WORLD WAR

JAMES BURNHAM

To: The Secretariat
From: Intelligence Section
Subject: Weekly Summary, International (excerpts)

Anglo-American moves are forming an intelligible pattern. In our report five weeks back, we noted: 1) the dissatisfaction of certain U. S. military leaders (e.g., Radford, LeMay) with the prevailing U. S. strategic assumptions; 2) a toughening British attitude, especially toward the Near East. Among data supporting 2) we mentioned "the hardened policy on Cyprus" and the airing of proposals for a mobile strategic reserve available to the Near East.

The New Series

The British have translated these two factors into overt military terms. The evacuation of British troops from Suez has been slowed. Simultaneously, two fully equipped battalions of paratroopers have been flown into the Cyprus bases.

(We call attention to a dialectical side effect. The increase in British military power on Cyprus makes it possible for London to be more conciliatory in negotiations with Athens over Cypriot independence.)

. . . Our protests on the President's Christmas message to the Peoples' Democracies were not merely rejected. In an unusually blunt statement, the "freeing of the satellites" was declared to be fixed American policy. The civilian head of the Air Force, Quarles, declared that American air power has superiority in the Far East. Admiral Radford, speaking from Formosa, stated that atomic weapons would be used if fighting started in the Formosa theater. The Air Force ordered the immediate production of a new wing of B-52's. It was disclosed that units of strategic bombers, fully briefed and ready for action, are continuously in the air, so that total destruction of American strategic bombing capability is now impossible. It was announced that a B-36 had flown several hours with an atomic reactor installed and for part of the time supplying power. A report claiming rapid progress on the medium range (1,500-mile) missile program was unexpectedly issued. The proposed military budget for Fiscal 1957 was raised nearly a billion dollars over early predictions, with talk of a bigger lift in 1958. The keel of another atomic submarine was laid. The Navy publicly discussed plans for an atom-propelled missile carrier.

As a culminating event of this series, *Life* magazine—long associated in business, religion and government with the Dulles interests—published a defense by the Secretary of State of the doctrine of massive retaliation, and a boast that the Eisenhower Administration has three times averted war by threatening us with atomic operations. . . .

The Pattern

The Anglo-American leadership, pressed by its military component, is attempting to reply to our political victories in the period July-December (from the Summit Meeting to the end of the UN Assembly). The reply takes the form of a symbolic "show of force"—a contemporary equivalent of the traditional imperialist maneuver, "showing the fleet."

The international objectives are: 1) to pose a threat to us that will act as a subjective deterrent to our continuing offensive; 2) to influence the neutralist governments, particularly of the Near and Middle East, away from us and toward the West as the ultimately winning side.

(We omit here reference to the U. S. domestic role of this demonstration as an election-year effort to display the incumbent Administration as one that keeps a "firm hand on the tiller"; and to the *Life* article as a trial balloon for a Dulles Presidential candidacy.)

There has been some initial success in relation to the second objective. The Egyptian Government has quieted its anti-Western rhetoric, our negotiations with the Japanese have slowed, the Vietnamese show more confidence, even Nehru's pendulum has swung several degrees away from us. In Indonesia and France, our expected parliamentary allies are showing more resistance to united front overtures. . . .

A Testing Period

It is to be observed that all American moves in this demonstration have been "psychological." The only external action—even this only a preparatory step—has been the British troop deployment. The critical question is whether the Anglo-American demonstration is another round in the "public relations" game which Americans confuse with political warfare, or the symptom of a new and serious development.

We incline to the former view, but warn that this conclusion must be tested in the period ahead. We have never doubted the superiority of Anglo-American armament. Our calculations are based in the first instance not on armament but on the decay of the politico-moral will of our opponents, a phase in the general decay of imperialism. Our opponents have the material power, but they cannot make effective use of it.

We have no reason for reappraisal unless the enemy carries through into some positive action: e.g., uses the Cyprus-based troops in Jordan or Syria; compels Nasser to break his armament agreement with us; starts bombing the air bases opposite Matsu; demands commitments from Nehru in return for aid; reinforces the trade boycott against us, etc.

Meanwhile we recommend: 1) that we stage an obvious but not irrevocable provocation to test the present tension of the enemy's will; 2) that we authorize extraordinary measures to acquire full information on the Eden visit to Washington; 3) that we order the appropriate operatives to strengthen the campaign in the U. S. against the "MacArthur mentality" that is expressed (however indirectly) in this demonstration, and against Dulles, who has yielded to it even if only for demagogic purposes.

Will the Chinese Overthrow Mao?

The author of this article, for more than twenty years a correspondent in China, will also be remembered as "Heptisax" of the 'Herald Tribune'

RODNEY GILBERT

During the past year it has become very much the fashion among tourists who have spent a few days in the Soviet Union to tell the wide world, as soon as they can get themselves interviewed, that the chances of a popular rising against the Red despotism are simply nil. Everybody is eating. Everybody's nakedness is covered. If you smile at a peasant or a factory hand, his reaction is an engaging grin. Not a word of criticism of the regime did the visitor hear voiced. So whoever cherishes a lingering hope that a revolution within the Red Empire may possibly dispose of our anxieties is thinking not only wishfully but fatuously.

Maybe so. But what our guided short-term observers think they have seen and heard is by no means necessarily the real picture.

There have been no American travelers making comparable tours of Red China. But there is some reason to believe that, if there had been, they would have brought back very similar warnings against pinning any hopes on popular hostility to the Mao Tse-tung regime. Several astute British journalistic observers, certainly not sympathetic with either theoretical or applied Communism, have seen a lot of Red China during the past eighteen months (under official guidance and constant surveillance, of course); and, though they did not like everything they saw, they came away fully convinced that the masses of the people were well pleased with the new order and thought themselves better off than ever before. These observers, indeed, are so sure of this that one might well assume that every refugee who gets out from under Red police control, to tell of nation-wide unrest, is a fantastic liar. But this, *the Reds tell us,* is not true. There *is* widespread unrest and there *is* widespread conspiracy against the Peiping regime.

During the past 2,000 years China has had scores of stupendous mass risings. Most have been suppressed, like the Taiping rebellion of a century ago and the Boxer rising in 1900; but quite a few have overthrown dynasties and have made way for new ones. The procedure was usually the same. Demoralization in the capital warned provincial officials that the dynasty was wobbling toward collapse. Provincial officials began feathering their nests at the expense of the people. Spirited rustics took to the hills and became bandits. Bandit groups negotiated alliances and became rebel hordes. When sent against them, soldiery deserted to them in great bodies. Leadership was evolved among the rebels; and, in time, they took the capital and extinguished the regime.

Exodus to the Cities

Is that a blueprint for a movement to wipe out the Red dictatorship? Certainly not a precise one. Times have changed. Bandits and rebels have to eat. During all the great rebellions of the past they were the champions of the masses, and they were adequately provisioned by the rural population. Now they are not. For the Reds have extended food control, backed by police control, down into the remotest hamlets, tightening it from month to month and year to year, until now the government takes the whole agricultural output and the farmer has a ration card. This entitles him and his family to a sub-subsistence diet, with not a grain of millet to spare for bandits, guerrillas and such like. Furthermore, there was a time when a village smith who joined the outlaws could make them as good swords and spears as were issued to imperial soldiery. But Chinese blacksmiths cannot make machine guns, tanks or observation planes.

For these reasons a rising against the Mao Tse-tung regime cannot start in the hills, as of yore, and get anywhere. When a Chinese rustic is now so thoroughly unhappy about his situation that he wants to run away from it, he does not turn to the hills as his forebears would have done. There is nothing there but more hunger and more misery. No, he and his wife and kids leave everything they have—their shacks and their few tools and sticks of furniture—and start trudging *toward town.* There had been some notice of this flight from the farm in the Red Chinese press in 1953, and it was always blamed on natural calamities. But early in 1954, when the new census figures revealed that the population of the big cities had increased by about 40 per cent in three years, it had to be taken seriously as a sign of unrest. Hordes were coming from districts that were not in famine areas. It was estimated that this movement accounted for an increase of about 3,000,000 in Shanghai's population. And by midsummer 1955 it had been decided to evict them wholesale. A million were to be driven out at the rate of 30,000 a day.

This effort, which, toward the end of August, got much unfavorable comment in the Far East, notably in Hongkong and Japan, has received some publicity in this country. One reason given for this and other omens of impending trouble was the bungling of the rural rationing system, which had been established a year before. As early as May 1955 it was admitted in Peiping that 150,000,000 people were on the verge of starvation, and the failure of the so-called "cadres" (Party agents) in the villages, who had seized all food supplies on behalf of the government and were then supposed to distribute an allowance to each farm family according to its needs, had made a mess of this system. Those who had ample grain

got more; those who had nothing, got nothing. Nothing was said officially at the time about the general revulsion against collectivization; but that came out later.

It was also in the spring of 1955 that the Communists revealed a very different kind of popular unrest among the villagers. They noted the great increase in the number of cases of arson, the assassination of rural officials, food riots and, finally, organized conspiracies against the regime. There was a conference of top judicial officials in Peiping from May 25 to June 17, to discuss the situation. Among other reasons for "disorderly conduct among the rustics," they cited the lack of enthusiasm among the cadres for disciplinary action. These small fry were accused of "rightist, pacifistic, lethargic thinking."

The only remedy discovered was more drastic measures against both farmers and cadres. A round-up of information on the subject of "anti-revolutionary activities and sabotage of economic construction," submitted to the "National People's Congress" by the Minister of Justice, Shih Liang, on July 29, 1955, revealed that throughout 1954 and the first half of 1955 the "People's Courts" had dealt with an average of about 750 cases a day of crime against the state.

In the meantime, however, the secret police had brought to light a symptom of impending trouble which has been familiar to the Chinese for twenty centuries—the rapid growth of secret revolutionary societies of a semi-religious character. Of this development the Communists have been fearful ever since they undertook the regimentation of the countryside. Whatever their alleged objectives, all such societies are now illegal; and the police discovery of some little group practicing mystical rites was always given wide and triumphant publicity.

But what the Peiping radio exposed on June 18, 1955, was not an isolated little nest of rebels in Shanghai, Hankow, or Chungking, but twenty-seven underground hideouts, with caches of food and weapons, of four different religious societies in rural areas in the border province of Chahar. Then, a week later, on June 24, as though to show that the subterranean agitation was not confined to the Chahar area, the same radio broke another story of mass arrests of "reactionary landlords and illegal rich farmers" in seventeen villages in southern Shantung, eastern Anhuei and northern Kiangsu. That is in eastern China, north of the lower Yangtze; and the territory thus described has been the incubator of a high percentage of China's great rebellions throughout the ages. The campaign against landlords and rich farmers was supposed to have been completed in 1952 with the elimination of about 17,000,000 of them; so the mention of them as organizers of a big subversive movement in 1955 was not convincing. Mao Tse-tung later had something to say about "new-rich farmers." But how a farmer can become newly rich in Red China is a mystery.

Nor was this the end of the revelations. One of the local secret cults in the Chahar area was called the *Yi Kuan Tao* (One Rule Way). But then the Shanghai police came up with an announcement of the arrest of 53 members of the same society in that city, fully 700 miles from the Chahar scene of operations. And late in September, as though to throw discretion to the winds, the Reds revealed their knowledge of the existence of ten such societies, functioning in fifteen provinces—all but two of the provinces in China proper—and widespread disorder had been earlier reported in one of these (Kiangsi). The names of the ten societies are given and they suggest, as scores of such organizations have done before, that they are borrowing their patron spirits, rites and rituals from Taoism's great store of ancient superstition and demonology, which have often proved capable of turning easy-going rustics into fanatics.

In the last published report on this subject the Reds indignantly noted that even cadres, the Party's intensively trained little jackals, were joining these wretched cults and that they were penetrating the armed forces. That is what really scares them; because the soldiery, of course, come from the same villages from which some people are running away to the cities while others are holding

It *Might* Happen

secret anti-Red meetings. And in the hands of the soldiery are all those splendid weapons from Soviet Russia for whose purchase the villagers have been reduced to a sub-subsistence living.

Mao's Outburst

And what is the Peiping hierarchy's reaction to all this evidence of popular ill will? It would appear to be mixed. But Mao Tse-tung has made it plain that he is viciously resentful. During the "National People's Congress" of July 1955, much was said about the failure of the country folk to understand what was good for them and about their inclination to resist the rationing and collectivization programs. Some delegates had the temerity to suggest that, in the business of socializing agriculture, it might be wise to hasten slowly. Even Li Fu-chun, head of the State Planning Commission and therefore top five-year-planner, is said to have submitted a relatively modest program for herding the rural population into collective farms. But it would also seem that the day after this Congress rose, Mao Tse-tung checked over its findings, called all the provincial Party chiefs together and delivered a heated harangue.

The failure and dissolution of cooperatives in some parts of the country was deplorable, he said. There was to be no more deference shown to rural prejudice against these institutions. Stalin had made a complete success of the job in six years; so China was going to have better than half of the farm families in 350,000 cooperatives by the spring of 1958—or else. The job would be complete by the end of 1960. So declaimed the boss. And the others slunk away to whisper their doubts to one another, according to reports reaching Hongkong. Indeed there must have been more than whispered dissent, for this Mao Tse-tung outburst was not published for nearly three months.

In support of the big chief's angry denunciation, the much feared and detested Minister of Security, Lo Jui-ching (China's Beria) did, however, make one of his exceedingly rare public statements. It was to the general effect that the people must take the Party's program and like it. To this he added the warning that persons having knowledge of subversive activities and failing to give information to the authorities were themselves guilty of a crime against the state and, when detected, would be severely punished.

That is the situation as it is known from Communist revelations. It would be rash to say that it presages a formidable rebellion in the near future. The few guerrillas that lead a fly-by-night life in the hills are not going to see it through. The farmer-sectarians who practice secret rites and exchange vows of vengeance against the Reds in caves and holes in the ground may not be the consistent resistance. But if they persist, as they presumably will, they can create an atmosphere inducive to big-scale mutinies. Then, if some favorably located military potentate decides to exploit that atmospheric condition, it can happen.

To suggest that Mao Tse-tung and his clique are enjoying the affection and confidence of the people, or that they are certain of the loyalty of their soldiery or of their huge civilian organization, or that Red China is a healthy, firmly established concern, is just twaddle; and, in this continuing cold war, nobody is doing the anti-Communist cause any good by passing along such false appraisals of despotism's security.

Then what should one say if asked about the chances of the Mao gang's survival in China? One should say that it may not be wiped out in a seismic upheaval tomorrow; but yet, it may be.

THE SOVIET ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

(*Continued from p. 15*)

efficient use. Such an inquiry would provide the necessary preparatory steps toward constructing a significant product aggregate.

Even then, as Mr. Clark well knows, the dangers inherent in comparison of aggregates are serious. Having observed, in a professional capacity, the vagaries of national accounting practices in various West European countries and having noted the infinite variety of adaptations that are possible, I came at last to the conclusion that income and product aggregates had to conform to the practical judgment of experienced observers if they were to be useful in guiding judgment on policy issues. There is, in brief, no inherent validity in the arithmetic processes governing the construction of national income and product aggregates. As Walter Bagehot was wont to say, "Sums are a matter of opinion."

The second comments are of particular interest. On the one hand the critic quite properly points out that international comparisons of output aggregates are unreliable. Dr. Alexander Gershenkron's work on Soviet machinery-industry index-numbers has shown definitively, for example, that the Soviet index was inflated by three times, by their own statistics, over a decade. He may be credited with destruction of the myth that Soviet production indexes were ever based on 1927-28 prices.

The critic takes issue with the well-established official notion that Russian standards of living, i.e., personal consumption, are improving at relatively the same rate as gross product. Mr. Clark implicitly tends to agree with his view in putting personal consumption at 43.5 per cent of GNP, thereby keeping consumption within at least intercontinental range of reality. This is, of course, a proposition in my argument—standards of personal consumption have quite probably declined a very great deal. This is the factor that has allowed the really remarkable increase in capital investment that has taken place in the USSR.

I would disagree, however, with the second critic's suggestion that the retarding forces at work in the Soviet economy are likely to be offset. Mr. Clark's view that the investment rate is likely to level off for a time seems much more probable, although I doubt that the annual increase in GNP would fall to as little as the 3 per cent Mr. Clark suggests. However, the difference is not great.

This may be the place to note that Mr. Clark's estimate of 3 per cent as the annual increase in Soviet GNP is a minority view. U.S. official estimates continue to suggest 7 per cent, and thereby to compound the U.S. official error in estimating Soviet economic capability.

Letter From London

F. A. VOIGT

Our newspapers are under a conventional obligation to be optimistic at the beginning of every year. But honesty makes it hard for them to respect this obligation; and some of them, while recognizing that things are not as good as they might be, tell us that we—the government and the people of this country—can make them as good as they ought to be. The *Times,* echoing Matthew Arnold and William Pitt (without acknowledgement), exhorts England to spread sweetness and light and to save herself by her exertions, and Europe by her example. The *Daily Express,* which has a circulation of more than four million, is peremptory: "War should be repudiated, It should be utterly dismissed from the thoughts of the public . . . war will have no place in the policies which Britain will pursue . . . Armaments should be reduced to the utmost extent . . . let the demand for arms be limited to the minimum that Britain requires for safety." Arms must not be used for "warning to some potentially hostile land."

The past Christmas is said (perhaps rightly) to have been the most cheerful since—since when? Nobody knows exactly, but in any case it was the most cheerful Christmas we have had since some unspecified Christmas before the war. The public is in a rather fatalistic mood, but, on the whole, cheerfully so. It is hard to say whether there is any general dissatisfaction with the Government. But among Conservatives — especially among those who do not hold office but are well informed (and even a few who do hold office, though not perhaps the highest)—there is deepening dissatisfaction.

Having done their duty by the New Year, the newspapers have turned to more serious matters. Some of the leading conservative dailies and weeklies have swiftly turned to what they regard as the most serious, or at least the most urgent, of all—the fitness or unfitness of the present Government to deal with the tasks that lie ahead. They pronounce it unfit, with a dissatisfaction not far from alarm.

The *Times,* by nature inclined to speak well rather than ill of governments, tells us that

> in some cases [the administration] does not appear to have thought through problems sufficiently; in others it has appeared to lack forthright decision.

The *Daily Telegraph,* which has never deviated from conservative principles and has gained a reputation for integrity, and a circulation of more than a million, writes that the Government

> has lost both decisiveness and prestige [and that the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, has] a favorite gesture . . . To emphasize a point he will clench one fist to smack the open palm of the other hand—but the smack is seldom heard. Most Conservatives and some of the wiser trade union leaders are waiting to feel the smack of firm government.

The *Daily Mail,* which is what it says it is, "For Queen and Commonwealth," writes:

> Too many events are wrapped up in uncertainty and indecisiveness. . . . The Government's trouble seems to be not paralysis so much as lack of will.

The weekly *Spectator* condemns what it calls the Government's "indecision and abstraction" in Cyprus and the Middle East. In the *Evening Standard,* Randolph Churchill, Sir Winston's son, describes the recent changes in the Government as "not a blood transfusion but a face-lift." Candidus, writing in the popular *Daily Sketch,* exhorts Sir Anthony Eden "to act with boldness and decision—and to act swiftly—to restore his reputation with his worried friends."

Such an attack—simultaneous but not concerted—on a British Government by a press which would much rather applaud than condemn is exceedingly rare. And severe as it is, it is far from disclosing the full extent of a dissatisfaction which is deepening to alarm—alarm not for the future of the Government but for the future of England.

There is no prospect of a better Government. There is no "coming man"—at least we know of none. It used to be customary in situations such as ours to ask for "younger men," but experience has shown that younger men make as many mistakes, and learn just as little from them, as their elders. The slogan "youth at the helm" has acquired an almost sinister undertone; for the ideologies—fascism, nationalism, national socialism, socialism, communism and pacifism—which have been the immediate cause of the upheavals, wars and massacres of our time were largely the consummation of that "revolt of youth" which was encouraged by the middle-aged, both on the Left and on the Right. In England youth did not, as in Germany, take the helm. Nevertheless successive British Governments, composed of elderly men, failed to avert disaster because they gave way, year after year, to the militant pacifism in which the "revolt of youth" was the driving force.

There is, today, much skepticism of simple and easy solutions and a general reluctance to take any risks. There is even a creeping doubt whether there is any solution to anything. In any case, the belief in conferences as a sovereign remedy for conflicts between powers is dead: it has been killed by the conferences held at Geneva last year.

Some observers see no hope for England except in a revival of the national spirit (national, not nationalist). But how is that spirit to be revived if it does not revive of its own accord? Whatever the answer, the immediate need is for good government, a government that will, if necessary, defy public opinion, risk defeat, and be prepared to go into opposition with the express purpose of warning the country of the dangers that lie ahead. England cannot pull her full weight in the Atlantic Alliance and save herself unless she has a government which recognizes, and compels the nation to recognize, certain irreducible realities: that we are not engaged in a dispute which can be settled by conferences or even by concessions; that we are not at peace but at war; that this war cannot be argued or negotiated out of existence; that it is a war which must be won (and won decisively) by the exercise of power, including armed power.

The Best of Everything

Advertising, in this age when many responsible people regard human survival as dubious, seems designed to mislead us into the belief that all is for the best in the best of possible worlds

RICHARD M. WEAVER

Culture is to a great extent a response to images that people carry around in their heads, and in past times most of these images have come to us from an assimilated religion and literature. Today, with advertising taking a good share of time and attention away from these, it is tempting to speculate on the effects of the imagery it tends to substitute. Granted that the mission of advertising is the practical one of selling, and granting moreover that the public has been educated to a certain good-humored skepticism regarding it — the *caveat emptor* the world over of the man being sold something — there still remains the possibility of definite effects upon outlook and mores. In brief, do certain advertising practices seriously interfere with the representation that man needs to have of himself and his society?

This is not a fresh criticism of advertisers for appealing to such base motives as wanting to get rich or be socially prominent, or for playing upon fear and hypochondria. These aspects of the institution are well-known and have been rather amply canvassed; they seem, however, to be more superficial — or at least more easily coped with—than certain deleterious effects which a great deal of advertising has upon the mind and the personality.

Reality Misconstrued

It requires a strong and active intelligence to resist any picture of the world which is constantly and studiously held up to the attention. One has to be an inventor to read well, said Emerson. The average consumer of newspapers and popular magazines is too passive a creature to invent something to put alongside the world which advertising sets before him. This is saying nothing of the unpleasantness involved, because what does one place alongside a world with the best of everything?

The bulk of present-day advertising comes as a consistent and unremitting misconstruing of reality. There are three areas in which it seems especially pernicious: its treatment of work, its treatment of history, and its jugglery of cause-and-effect relations. In these it faithfully reflects the modern "liberal" self-deceiving mind, which has brought the world to a chaos of contradictions.

The first of the three areas shows an especially telltale trend, which serves to illuminate the way things are going. Even twenty years ago most advertisers who had some product that involved use were satisfied to show a picture of someone using it. If it was laundry soap, there was an illustration of somebody laundering; if a saw, of somebody sawing; and so on, with no qualms about the dignity of labor. The postgraduate school of advertising which seems in charge today has got beyond crudities of this sort. Now pictures that might recall labor or strain have been largely banished, and what one sees is the end product, with the happy buyer looking on in relaxed satisfaction. If it is a laundry soap, the shining clothes are depicted; if it is a saw, the sawn logs, and thus it goes.

The principle seems to be that anything suggestive of struggle or fatigue or any kind of strenuousness is interdicted from the best of all possible worlds. In keeping with the pushbutton existence we are threatened with, everything somehow gets done without effort. The captain of his fate and master of his soul has only to look on. In a broad description of the trend, the whole motif has been shifted from achievement to relaxation and enjoyment, or passive attitudes.

The personality gets a wrench when one has to turn away from this dream world—labor absent, death denied, old age in the background or banished from view altogether—and confront the world that is ours. It is generally idle to dispute with those who believe that this is really "the height of the times" in the sense of being the age of fullest happiness and fruition. Without arguing conclusions, it can at least be noted that we live in the presence of the following facts.

History Bowdlerized

Never before have so many persons of learning and responsibility felt that the very survival of the race is a contingent matter—and contingent upon things that are not going very well. A monstrous fanaticism, based upon a perverse reading of history and accepting force as a legitimate weapon, is abroad in the world. Labor, while more productive in a material way, is for the millions increasingly divorced from natural rhythm. Mental illness has almost reached plague proportions. And popular culture, as measured by reading and entertainment, is on a toboggan slide toward cheapness and vulgarity. Set this world beside the one the advertiser depicts and says he is helping to create, and you have cause for a disturbance that looks like schizophrenia. Perhaps the disorder shows itself in the illogical policies of modern governments, which go unrebuked by the people, and in the zest with which peoples enter upon destruction when unleashed by war.

It is not surprising to find the same fixation upon unreality when history becomes the subject. Historical themes and scenes are popular with advertisers, but even the casual reader can

detect a curious transfiguration. The means of presentation are now rich beyond compare, yet history somehow always gets presented as something that didn't really happen. The advertiser takes a cute attitude toward it, pulling out whatever is exotic, sensational or amusing, while suggesting by arrangement and tone that it could not occur with real people like those reading the advertisements. (After all, history has been defined as unpleasant things that happen to other people.) History in its true lineaments is too gloomy, too full of monitions, too fearful a commentary on the nature of man, to be compatible with the principles of advertising. So this bowdlerized version is constantly fed to a public which is historically almost illiterate anyhow. It cuts them further off from the past than before, diminishing their responsibility and their capacity to predict. From "it couldn't really have happened" it may be only a step to "It Can't Happen Here." It is a miseducation with serious potentialities.

Reasoning Confused

The unwary reader may be further disoriented with reference to the world he lives in by a persistent undermining of cause-and-effect relations.

One of the commonest methods of propaganda is to confuse cause-and-effect reasoning by insisting upon one cause where there exists in fact a plurality of causes, or by connecting remote causes and effects while ignoring the important intermediate ones. Everyone has seen examples of this kind of weighting: a romance goes on the rocks because a certain party neglected to buy a certain kind of cosmetic; or, the nation's armament is now invincible because some company has perfected a certain gadget. We are familiar with the kind of illustration which shows together two extremely disparate things; the contrast is an effective eye-catcher, and we are driven to read the print below to discover how in the dickens they ever got into the same picture. The connection will be expounded in the manner described above, and with those made credulous by Sunday-supplement science and the believe-it-or-not type of feature, it may pass as unobjectionable. So far has this gone that the full-page displays in our magazines of widest circulation may remind one of Dr. Johnson's famous description of metaphysical poetry, where "the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together." The difference is that the architecture of cause and effect which the poet most carefully thought out is here apt to be no more than a flimsy facade.

The establishment of causal relations is a difficult enough matter under the best conditions. Nothing is helped when people are habituated to make these essentially illogical connections. How much bombardment of this kind the mass mind can stand without showing degenerative symptoms is perhaps a subject for the psychiatrist.

Stemming from this same practice of taking logic lightly are some of the weird operations with language. As Charles W. Morton has pointed out, there has developed what might be called the "antonymous" school of advertising prose, by which modifiers of opposite meaning are blandly applied to the same article. The object apparently is to broaden the appeal until the product is all things to all men. Consequently we are assured that this wine has a "dry, sweet flavor" and that tobacco will delight with its "mild, rich aroma." If the article can be described as "ruggedly delicate," it stands a chance to catch both masculine and feminine fancy. The style has already spread to politics, and we seem to hear increasingly of the "liberal-conservative" faith of so-and-so or of the "conservative-liberal" policy that is going to please everybody. Elsewhere we have reached the point where making war is called "restoring peace" and each new engine of destruction is written up as a further pledge of our pacific intentions.

This is, of course, only one phase of the debauchery of language by advertising and the looser kind of journalism. The everlasting attempt to prostitute the word, to harness even its resonances to the work of selling or ingratiating, is a large and depressing subject in itself. Language as an indispensable convention suffers from such tampering, to say nothing of the esthetic impairment.

It is sometimes said half humorously that the public is king today, or that the common man is royalty. I would suggest that this comparison contains more truth than humor, and that the art of advertising, with its auxiliary professions, is but the ancient art of the courtier in modern dress and setting.

It was a precept of courtiership always to flatter the king, and some weak-headed monarchs were flattered into a state where they lost all perception of reality. The suitors of the public today are well up on this principle of success at court. It was likewise a precept that no one should ever be a bearer of bad news to the king if he could get out of it. There was too much human tendency to identify the bearer with the news. So our advertisers always manage to be bearers of good tidings, and if evil has to be reported, it is in connection with the king's enemies, which in this case are work, self-denial, boredom, disappointment, and the like. Thus the incessant effort of flattery and the withholding of the unpleasant news of life builds up insulation against a world which everyone is destined to come to terms with. At some point a reorientation has to occur, and where it has been painful, monarchs have been known to look for scapegoats. The old courtier generally understood that his was a risky business.

Few will deny that the proliferating products and gadgets of an industrial economy need to be introduced and sometimes explained to a potential consuming public. There is a core of information in all but the silliest advertising. The real question is whether such need carries a license for these excesses. Even though the times are in no mood for a self-denying regimen, and even though some doctors of the science of society are busy elevating the consumer to the pedestal occupied by the erstwhile man of achievement, there is a minimum below which realism cannot safely fall.

It was one of Napoleon's acid observations that cannon had killed the feudal order of society and that ink would kill the modern social organization. The prophecy continues to reverberate. The art of advertising and its allied crafts go too far toward substituting dream and wishful thinking for reality. Man's conception of life is changed importantly when you expel the idea of tragedy. When you expel history also, you create a vacuum into which almost anything can rush.

The PRINTED Word

JONATHAN MITCHELL

A Week with the Atlanta Constitution

Like newspaper editors everywhere, the editors of the *Atlanta Constitution* had to deal with the Eastland Subcommittee's hearings on the Communist penetration of the New York press. During the hearings, the *New York Times* complained loudly and turgidly that it was the subcommittee's secret target, and thus the story became that of Communist infiltration into the *Times*.

Editorially, the *Constitution* ignored the hearings. But there are other ways in which a newspaper can express its attitude. One is by headlines. In four successive days of headlines, the *Constitution's* copy desk managed never once to mention the *New York Times*. It did, however, mention the *New York Daily News*, whose only connection with the hearings was to have briefly employed one of the eighteen witnesses. (The *News*, of course, has a conservative reputation.)

Kamin Acquittal Played Up

Another way in which a newspaper shows its attitude is by the play it gives a story.

The *Constitution* ran the first day's story of the hearings at the bottom of page two. Next day, however, the story had been pushed back to page seven. What makes this seem odd is that the *Constitution* found room on page two for a long story on the acquittal of Leon V. Kamin, the Harvard research assistant cited by Senator McCarthy two years ago. Whatever else may be said about it, the Kamin story was not a fresh, unexploited news situation; the infiltration of the *New York Times* was. The Kamin story, however, permitted an unfavorable mention of Senator McCarthy in its headline.

The third day was a Saturday. The *Constitution* had a thin paper, with all out-of-town stories crowded into the first three pages. The Eastland story was again at the bottom on page two. At the top of page three, a much more prominent position, was the story of William Henry Taylor's exoneration by the International Monetary Fund. Which was more newsworthy—the *New York Times* or the relatively obscure Taylor?

The fourth, and final, story was on page three. The body of the story carried a formal denial by Senator Eastland that the *New York Times* had been singled out for attack.

Are Communists News?

The main story in Atlanta, as elsewhere in the South, was segregation. (Southern headline writers have shortened "segregation" to "mix"; e. g., Anti-Mix Laws Readied.") On January 10, the day the Georgia Legislature met, Attorney General Cook sent the presiding officers of Senate and House a report on alleged subversive influences within the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. It was accompanied by 400 pages of photostats. This story was given three sticks, under a one-column head, on the front page—an editorial decision that seemed defensible. Accusations against the NAACP have been made many times before (and stoutly denied by the NAACP leaders).

The next day Louisiana district attorney J. St. Clair Favrot announced that anti-segregation pamphlets being mailed from Baton Rouge, bore the imprint: "Southern Regional Committee of the Communist Party, P. O. Box 464, St. Louis, Mo."

The *Constitution* put *this* story on page 12.

The Anti-China Lobby

The *Constitution* is presided over by Ralph McGill, a figure of great influence in the Southeastern states. He writes a daily front-page column dimly reminiscent of the late Arthur Brisbane's—far-ranging thoughts in simple words. His subject on January 9 was Quemoy and Matsu, on which, he explained, he had information from an unnamed person "close to the State Department":

> If the time bomb (of Quemoy and Matsu) should explode it might touch off a world war. The odds are this latter tragedy will not happen. Our only pledge is to defend Formosa. We publicly have said, through the President himself, we will not intervene in an attack on either of the islands unless it is of such size and direction as to indicate an assault on Formosa.
>
> Therein lies the great hazard. An amphibious invasion, with air cover, takes on momentous size. Who will be able to view it and reach the necessary conclusion? Who will have the information necessary to determine if the attack will end in defeat or, if successful, whether it will then continue on to Chiang's island fortress? There's the rub.

There have been many, and conflicting, statements about Quemoy and Matsu but, nominally at least, we are pledged to defend them (although with the proviso that we shall decide on the timing and means). McGill might argue that this pledge does not mean much; he ought not to imply—as he does here—that no pledge exists.

"Chiang Has No Right . . ."

The rest of his column, however, makes clear what he is getting at:

> The opinion persists that by spring the Communists will attack these controversial pieces of land, for so many centuries obscure fishing and agricultural islands.
>
> No military people anywhere believe Chiang's troops can defend them. (Formosa is regarded as defensible but only if the United States fleet and air force join heavily in assistance—as we are pledged to do if Formosa and its associated Pescadores islands are attacked.)
>
> But, if the invasion of the off-shore points comes in April or May . . . and if Chiang calls for help . . . then indeed will a great deal of political fat be fried in that fire.
>
> World opinion rather well supports our view that Formosa has a right to independence . . . it was never truly Chinese property. Yet, opinion strongly insists Chiang has no right to hold the islands so close to the mainland.
>
> Our military men fear political pressure may throw us in—too late.

In short, Mr. McGill and the *Constitution* mean to say: Chiang Kai-shek has no right to Quemoy and Matsu; if he were only told so by the State Department, the fuse of the time bomb would be extinguished.

From the Academy

RUSSELL KIRK

Behold Behemoth

Michigan State University (formerly College), at East Lansing, has a beautiful campus—or had, until most of it got covered with "modified collegiate Gothic" buildings in recent years. An elderly gentleman, walking across it two years ago, was startled to see a number of young men, standing under the trees, flinging back their right arms in a curious gesture. "What are those boys doing?" he asked his guide.

"Practicing flycasting," said the guide. "It's a physical education course."

"But where are their rods?" inquired the old gentleman.

"This is Beginning Flycasting," the guide informed him, tolerantly. "A first-term course. They don't get rods until they're enrolled in Advanced Flycasting."

Yes, MSU gives credit for flycasting —only undergraduate credit though. It also gives credit for some other very interesting subjects, including a whole four-year curriculum in Packaging (in which discipline, alas, no one had enrolled at last report).

Michigan State College was established a hundred years ago as a school of agriculture. At first it was overshadowed by the famous University of Michigan, at Ann Arbor. By the 1930's, however, it had become a very large college. This growth was further accelerated once John A. Hannah was made simultaneously president of the College and a doctor of laws, in 1938. A program of physical expansion and of recruiting students was commenced; the football team was built up, and within the past two decades the enrollment has nearly tripled, being now in the neighborhood of 16,000—the eighth largest in America. Fifty million dollars have been expended on buildings during the past decade, and an equal sum is to be spent during the next five or six years. The distinguished scholars on the faculty, however, may be numbered on the fingers of one hand.

Competing with the University of Michigan for state appropriations and popularity, MSC succeeded, on its hundredth anniversary, in exerting sufficient pressure upon the Michigan legislature to have its name changed to "University." There are, nevertheless, no schools of medicine or law. This is the oldest and biggest of the "land-grant colleges" subsidized by the Morrill Act of 1862. According to President Hannah, its end is "service to all." He predicted, last August, that MSU will double in size within fifteen years.

This increase in numbers and wealth —Michigan State is but one of hundreds of agricultural schools, technical colleges, and teachers' colleges in process of growth into something quite different from their original condition—has brought with it severe problems. Does such a university, on assuming the name of university, take on the traditional responsibilities of university education? The tendency of most of these newly expanded institutions has been to emphasize "service to all," rather than liberal and professional disciplines. The very scale of such places, originally designed to be simple, easily-administered units, has tended to hamper real scholarship. At MSU, one dormitory complex will lodge four thousand students, when completed. The vast dining-halls are a far cry from the old-fangled college dormitory, and the television sets at either end of the great lounges keep the students from the necessity of ever being alone in the realm of intellect. Business-machine methods of registration, testing, and grading have vitiated the old professor-student relationship. Students' numbered identity-cards are replacing even proper names. And the intelligent professor at such institutions, as Dr. Gilbert Highet has remarked, often feels himself a prisoner, rather than a philosopher. The aggrandizement of MSU has been paralleled by protests and resignations among the faculty.

When a lowering of degree-requirements was pushed through the graduate school last year, Dean Erickson of the College of Education found it necessary to reply to charges of debasement of standards. "Don't use that phrase!" he entreated. "Say rather that we are extending the opportunity." The opinion of some members of the faculty was expressed by a well-known professor's comments on President Hannah's first talk to the faculty in fall term, 1955: "The President gave a prodigious prognosis in his talk of all the buildings we're going to put up, and all the students we're going to have. He wants to get the best brains he can to supervise the buildings and blueprints. He also told us to plug for a unified sewage system for East Lansing. After an hour and a half of this, he said in the last thirty seconds, 'We are interested in good scholarship here.' "

No, progress at MSC isn't going to end with Flycasting and Packaging. The just-published annual Report of Progress at the University declares; "The literal-minded may ask us to be specific—to define the tasks, to describe the boundaries of this dedication. To them, we must reply that by its very nature, a university cannot set a limit on its mission, or define its objectives exactly . . . . We cannot rest content with the past or present, but must forever press forward . . . " Uh-huh.

Some people are so obdurate as to maintain a different opinion. A professor of English at another university in Michigan writes to me, "Did you see the glad announcement that Michigan State will offer in February a course for five *graduate* credits in how to drive a car safely? The descriptive blurb has much jargon about highway problems and the modern age of wheels and gears; but nothing could disguise the complete intellectual bankruptcy of this flourishing Benthamite colossus." Yet whatever may have happened to the bank and capital of the mind at MSU, there's no danger of financial bankruptcy: the Michigan legislature already is besought to appropriate, at its next session, funds for building a new College of Education, College of Engineering, College of Business and Public Service, and Basic College.

ARTS and MANNERS

Well, it came up termites at our house the other day and I'm not sure the subject belongs in this column: such arts as the termites have are nefarious and their manners are atrocious. True, they eat silently but—oh, boy!—effectively. What I mean is when you put your foot down in the living room and suddenly find you are in the cellar, that's going too far.

After the first moments of panic, we 'phoned the termite people and a crew of carpenters. There was some explanation of it being Sunday and golden hour rates, but I was in no mood to bargain. "Just get here right away," was all I asked. I knew a fellow who would give me a *third* mortgage on the house for only 10 per cent a month.

Shortly thereafter, we heard the march of tramping feet across our lawn and the doorbell rang. I opened the peephole and gasped: it was an army, terrible with banners. I opened the door and stepped outside. "Now, just a minute," I said. "It's bad, but I can't pay for all these people."

The mob began to yell and scream. Puzzled, I looked at the banners and dimly realized it wasn't the workmen. Two men stepped forward, presented me with their credentials from UNESCO, and asked if it were true I intended to exterminate the termites. "Damned right!" I said. Whereupon, one of them got up on a soapbox and informed me that such measures were contrary to the Genocide Convention and that I was violating every treaty America had made with Outer Mongolia, Red China and Eastern Germany.

He was followed by some representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union, who triumphantly exhibited a writ of *habeas corpus* and a stay of execution. The ACLU leader made an impassioned speech in behalf of the Bill of Rights, and pointed out 1) that there were no termites in in my house; 2) that if there were, they were being detained illegally; 3) that they were American termites and had no connection with the Russian breed; 4) that termites were social insects and had their own culture and civilization and didn't have to conform to any bourgeois notions of mine; and 5) that the termites and their ancestors had lived in the house long before I came into it and that I was doing exactly what Mussolini had done in Ethiopia, England in India, Portugal in Goa—

"And what Russia did in Poland and Czechoslovakia?" I interrupted.

This was greeted with boos—which changed to cheers as a pair of Siamese twins, one an investigator for the Fund for the Republic and the other an employee of the Hennings Committee, mounted the box. They had come, they said, to see how my security regulations were being administered and asked me whether I had given the alleged termites a chance to confront their accusers face to face. I was forced to admit I hadn't done that.

Whereupon an ADA speaker pointed out that I was using the familiar technique of guilt by association. Just because *some* termites had destroyed houses didn't mean that *all* termites destroyed houses. And a man who was a dead ringer for Dean Griswold, Harvard accent and all, shook his finger in my face and declared that the fact that the termites had made no answer to the charges I had loosely hurled against them meant nothing at all. They might, he said, have been deaf termites; they might not have been active termites for a number of years; they might not have testified because, in so doing, they might be forced to name other ex-termites.

The Dean was followed by Harvey Matusow, who freely admitted he had lied when he swore some termites were termites: and he warned that no reproduction of what he said could be used by anybody, since the copyright belonged to Cameron and Kahn. Elmer Davis said that if what Matusow said was true—and he had no reason to doubt it—then the termites were completely innocent.

I'd had enough—more than enough—and when the next fellow tried to get on the soapbox, I kicked him in the shin and got on myself. "This," I said, "is my house. I've paid for it—well, nearly paid for it—and I don't want any damned termites in it, and I'm going right ahead and get rid of 'em. And if that be treason, you know what you can do."

There were cries of "McCarthyism!", "Fascist!", "Warmonger!", "Redbaiter!" and "Lynch him!" They unfurled their banners and began circulating petitions through the large group of spectators who had gathered. Forty-two prominent citizens, including Eleanor Roosevelt, signed immediately. Looking around desperately for some help, I caught sight of the exterminators and the carpenters I had sent for, and signalled them to come inside and get going. But they wouldn't cross the picket line.

Yielding to social pressure, I spoke to the UNESCO boys. "How about a meeting at the Summit?" I asked. "Let's go inside and talk it over." Smiles broke across their hitherto impassive faces, and they broke into "The Internationale" with overtones of "For He's a Jolly Good Fellow."

I opened the door, waved the entire crowd into my living room, and watched happily as they tumbled through the floor into the cellar.

With the picket line thus cleared, I had no trouble with my workmen. "Is that stuff you're using strong enough?" I asked. They assured me it was. "Double the dosage!" I cried.

We have a brand-new termite-proof living-room floor now, and I've had the cellar cemented and hermetically sealed. Just before they filled up the final hole, I thought of something else that belonged there, and inserted a copy of the book-review section of the *New York Times* for January 1 of this year. I circled a critique by a Mr. Cabell Phillips. In a review of Senator John F. Kennedy's *Profiles in Courage*, Mr. Phillips suddenly reaches into left field and comes out with some *obiter dicta* on the years "from 1949 to 1954, when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy held the United States Senate paralyzed in terror." I want to forget that horrible period when nobody in this land, in the United States Senate or out of it, dared speak—but I think posterity ought to know what went on.

Some day, centuries hence, some intrepid archaeologist will open the tomb, ponder over the eggheaded specimens, and—provided the termites don't eat it first—come across that review and realize what a really silly old newspaper the *New York Times* was.

MORRIE RYSKIND

BOOKS IN REVIEW

In the Broad Stream

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

John O'Hara is a serious novelist who wishes with a great deal of yearning intensity to be taken seriously. The perfervid quality of his desire sometimes makes him extremely self-conscious. He is apt to press for attention, particularly in his statements about other writers. His sexual passages sometimes scream at the reader; it is as if he were saying, "Look, I'm the only honest writer about sex in America." But in *Ten North Frederick* (Random House, $3.95) O'Hara is disciplined beyond his former wont. This is well-rounded fiction, relaxed and mournful even in its most unpleasant realism. As a story, it is filled with a sense of a whole community, but it is also intensely personal. The skeletons shake and rattle in the boarded-up attic closets of the Chapin house at 10 North Frederick Street, Gibbsville, Pa. Gibbsville is, of course, a thinly disguised version of Mr. O'Hara's home town of Pottsville, a community which contains just about everything in its mixed middle-class and proletarian microcosm.

In *Ten North Frederick* Mr. O'Hara takes an extremely long view. This is a three-generation story, and at times it assumes the quality of a parade of horrors. The first of Mr. O'Hara's Chapins, Ben and Charlotte, had the bad luck to produce a couple of stillborn babies, one of them obviously a monster. This naturally served to warp Charlotte's relationship to Joe Chapin, her only normal son, and it set Ben, her bewildered husband, to haunting a red light district in Philadelphia for his lugubrious satisfactions. Joe Chapin had better luck than his father, for his plain wife, Edith, believed with an unspontaneous solicitude in making her marriage a planned and charted success. The trouble with Edith was her possessiveness, which drove her to crazy lengths (and a silly revenge) in the effort to own her husband completely. In the end Edith's selfishness betrays her; she alienates both her husband and her children, Ann and Joby.

Mr. O'Hara chronicles the glacial drift of the Chapins' years with a Hardyesque attention to the gloomy irony which seems to be the single indulgence of the President of the Immortals. O'Hara is an utterly disenchanted writer whenever he looks at life in terms of decades. Fortunately for the reader, there is another O'Hara—the O'Hara of the enchanted moment. Though time runs on to a dreary beat over the decades both Joe Chapin and his daughter Ann manage to snatch at sweetness. Ann's first marriage to a piano player in a name band, is broken up by her misguided parents. But it was beautiful and magical while it lasted, a thing of Cheshire-cat smiles and excruciatingly happy tears carried out to the lilt of "Sweet and Lovely." Even though it ends badly, with a family-dictated abortion and an annulment, it deepens Ann's perceptions to the point where she can forgive her father and love him all the more for his mistake about her welfare.

As for Joe, the father, he has the dignity that comes to all men when they learn how to meet failure without losing self-respect. Joe is played for a sucker by Pennsylvania politicians who take his money and then turn him down for the lieutenant governorship. He goes toward his death in a state of armed truce with his wife after both of them have engaged in momentary infidelities. Joe utters no complaints; he is not one to indulge in self-pity, unless a heightened consumption of whisky is a form of self-pity. Nor is Ann a whimperer when her second marriage goes on the rocks.

The thing that makes this O'Hara novel something more than a dull and sordid chronicle of second-rate lives is the author's sense of the absurd intermixtures that go to make up any life. O'Hara writes about young love with an eye and ear for wonder in the commonplace that recalls Arthur Davison Ficke's sonnet: "I only know our first impassioned kiss/Was in your cellar rummaging for beer." He can distill the glory of a moment by mentioning a snatch of song or by evoking a vagrant memory of Dan Moriarty's famous speakeasy. O'Hara is a true child of popular culture, which he works into his prose with all the appropriate rhythms. The preoccupations of teenagers, the foibles of country club life, the problems of young married couples moving into the Age of the Children, the inevitable capitulations of middle age—all of these things carry no great tragic weight when taken in isolation. But glimpsed against the procession of the decades in Gibbsville they seem somber and at the same time piercingly nostalgic.

Has O'Hara, then, the true tragic sense of life? He hasn't quite reached that state of illumination. What he seems to lack is a feeling that life is something to be accepted as a supreme gift even though it must end amid the sadness of failing powers, the loss of friends who are gone forever. O'Hara doesn't accept consciousness as a miracle raised from dust which is in itself a miracle.

To put it succinctly, he lacks the Schweitzer touch of reverence. His people have a rage to live; but the rage is never consistent with humility or the glad heart, or with such a thing as delight in skills, tastes and excellences. O'Hara likes to write about Pennsylvania families, but his choice of subject never includes one of those

close-knit Pennsylvania family groups that can produce an Emily Kimbrough and her two ebullient and fantastically energetic daughters, or a talented tribe of Kellys running from oarsman-contractor John to the enchanting Grace.

The important thing about O'Hara, however, is that he is still growing in his middle-to-old age as a novelist. In a period which makes novels out of the tidy room in Bedlam or seeks universality amid the parochial disturbances of futile artists' colonies, O'Hara sticks to the broad stream. On the basis of *Ten North Frederick* he may be expected some day to do something truly good.

Chinese Red and Scholastic Blue

China Under Communism, by Richard L. Walker. 403 pp. New Haven: Yale University Press. $4.50

Mandarin Red, by James Cameron. 334 pp. New York: Rinehart and Company. $3.50

China Under Communism is an invaluable and unique compendium of information, obtained mainly by painstaking research and study of the Chinese-language material provided by the Communists themselves in their press and radio, government decrees, and pronouncements. But Mr. Walker writes such a pedestrian, determinedly "scholarly" style that he can rarely stir the reader's imagination, or evoke pity or terror—for all the proof he presents concerning the starved, miserable, cowed, cruel, weary and hopeless condition of the Chinese people under the Communist Iron Heel. Mr. Cameron, by contrast, went to China determined to try and like it. In his ignorance, he conscientiously endeavors to persuade himself and his readers that the gray, drab, and inhuman conformity of the Communist way of life is counterbalanced by an improved material condition for the Chinese people.

This paradox is perhaps explained by the tendency of American universities to set up standards of Liberal orthodoxy as confining as the scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Instead of conformity to the mystique of a church, we now require devotion, in the name of Liberalism or progressive-mindedness, to "objectivity," meaning refusal to believe that there are any absolute values, any blacks or whites, because, wherever the eye turns, it can only see shades of gray. In his valiant and learned endeavor to combat the influence of the Lattimore-Fairbank-I.P.R. school of thought with a massive array of facts, Walker clearly deems it necessary to present a "balanced" and unemotional record, presumably so that he cannot be smeared as a heretic. This no doubt explains his failure to mention the works of those of his predecessors who understood—and warned us against—the consequences of a policy based on the supposition that the Communists were liberal agrarian reformers. And it may explain also his conclusion, unwarranted by the facts he presents, that we can discover ways of making Chinese Communist power "disintegrate internally" without war. Like Mr. Bowles, he advocates a bigger and better Marshall Plan for Asia as an effective means of combating Communism, because it will create "alternatives which the people will choose instead of Communism." Yet any reader of his book must be convinced that people do not "choose Communism"; they are coerced into submitting to it.

The scholastic imperatives under which the author of *China Under Communism* labored thus tend to obscure the conclusions that a logical mind must draw from his important book. Another of his difficulties was the aversion of the "liberal mind" to facing up to the full horror and menace of Communist techniques for paralyzing the will to resist. As he informs us, Edward Hunter's *Brain Washing in Red China,* which explains and illustrates the process by which the Communists have hypnotized or terrorized the Chinese intelligentsia into support of their mind and soul destroying tyranny, is "still dismissed in some academic circles as mostly fiction." Yet this book introduced a new term into our language, and forewarned us concerning the treatment which American prisoners of war were to receive in Korea. While daring to honor Hunter's book as "a start at analysis" Richard Walker has, it seems to this reviewer, taken too little cognizance of its poignant narratives of individual experiences with and reactions to "brain washing." Otherwise he would not have written that "usually all doubts are resolved and the trainee gives himself enthusiastically to every task . . . [and] in place of his feeling of guilt is fired with the conviction that he must . . . help others find peace of mind through service to the Organization." Yet, on a previous page, Walker writes that among the trainees, some of whom become maniacs, "the cynics and those with a sense of humor seem to survive best." Which conclusion not only contradicts his observation that most doubts are *usually* resolved, but also provides ground for hoping that the Chinese will preserve their civilized values by passive resistance under the pretense of conformity, long enough for it to be worthwhile liberating them if the West finally comes to its senses, backs the resistance movement, and unleashes Chiang Kai-shek's forces.

One hopes that Mr. Walker's aseptic treatment of his subject may, indeed, succeed in inducing some case-hardened "liberals" to read him, and learn the horrible truth about the Communist way of life. The book proves down to the ground that the Chinese people, in losing their liberty, have gained neither bread nor security, nor hope of a better life, nor surcease from unending toil, and are today even worse off, materially as well as politically and spiritually, than under the Chiang Kai-shek regime. And its statistical evidence concerning the number of peasants who have died of starvation because the food they produce has been taken from them for export to the Soviet Union, together with his detailed account of how Peking has surpassed even Moscow's record of rule by terror, are no less convincing and terrible.

This is a book that everyone should buy and give and read and use to confound the enemies of freedom, as also the faint-hearted or self-seeking, who want us to "recognize" and do business with the oppressors of the Chinese people. The latter are, potentially, the greatest menace the United States has ever faced.

I should like to incarcerate James Cameron in one of the grim Chinese Communist "hotels," resembling prisons but lacking even toilets, which he so graphically describes, un-

til he had read every line of Richard Walker's book. He might then emerge to rewrite *Mandarin Red* with the background knowledge necessary to interpret, and draw valid conclusions from, the variety of his experiences in travelling over a large part of the "enormously exciting but oddly depressing" land of China. His ignorance of the Chinese language, and his consequent dependence on government-supplied interpreters, was no greater a handicap than his determination, in his own words, "to lean over backwards to give honor to the triumphs of the Revolution"; "to see the best through a smokescreen of hokum"; and to believe that the Communists have "produced a nation happier than ever before."

Mr. Cameron does, however, have a sense of humor, midway between laughter and tears, and at the margin cannot control his revulsion against the drab and dreary Communist way of life, where almost everyone of both sexes, "from the Prime Minister to the postman," is garbed in the same depressing and formless blue "boiler suit," and where everyone everywhere endlessly repeats the clichés of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist dogma. Despite his desire to believe what he was told, therefore, he cannot ignore the evidence of the compulsions that ensure the conformity. His book, like the curate's egg, is very good in parts. Certainly it is unlikely to make anyone believe that Communism is an improvement on the "capitalist system," or better even than Western colonial rule, or in any way preferable to what the author persists in describing in Communist terms as the "vicious system" of Kuomintang rule.

FREDA UTLEY

Respecter of Outlaws

The Inmost Leaf, by Alfred Kazin. 273 pp. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. $4.75

By far the longest and most important war in human history has pitted neither nation against nation nor king against king, but the Third Person Plural against the First Person Singular: any coercing form of the Group, the Joiner, the Statist, the self-appointed "Norm," and every persevering "I" who has ever been man enough to stand up and speak for himself.

It is a guerrilla war, of course; it is currently in one of its most intensive stages; and it is fought perennially on a universal front by solitary snipers whom their neighbors call Fools, and whom the Group either kills off, like Christ or St. Joan, or makes fun of, like Kierkegaard or Tolstoy, or, what is worse, eventually "honors"—when they are securely dead.

It is these valiant, arrogant, and frequently tiresome souls whom Alfred Kazin celebrates in *The Inmost Leaf*: a dozen or so of the poets, outlaws, witnesses, and extremists whose writings give us what T. S. Eliot once cited in Blake: "a peculiar honesty, which, in a world too frightened to be honest, is peculiarly terrifying."

Blake himself is the subject of Mr. Kazin's longest essay, and a shrewd, loving, enterprising piece it is. But he is just as refreshing with e. e. cummings, Gide, Sherwood Anderson, Thoreau, Lawrence, Melville, and that warm, incisive, wholly discomfiting genius, Simone Weil. He is also sympathetic to all the unofficial literary forms—the diary, private letters, and marginalia—that are most hospitable to personal testament, and he adds one of the most intelligent discussions I have seen of the recent gloomy tendency of the young writer to solve his financial problems by smothering himself under the glass bell of some college English department.

Altogether, then, a good book; and if I have any adverse criticism to suggest, it is only this: since he writes so respectfully of outlaws, I wish Mr. Kazin had been a little less temperate, modest, and well-adjusted himself. I wish he had committed Alfred Kazin a great deal more and had been excessive, imprudent, even wrong. After all, his heroes were, and if he can only admire them safely, I am afraid he must incur the rebuke—an extremist's, to be sure—which Jean Genet once made to André Gide: "I do not respect judges who lean affectionately towards the accused."

But having made that rebuke, I want, perversely, to withdraw it. The other day I saw a review which actually attacked Mr. Kazin for offering his personal opinions. His enemies are mine. It is not on him that I wish to draw my sniper's bead, ever.

ROBERT PHELPS

Best Yet

The Communist Party of the United States of America, prepared by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary. U.S. Government Printing Office. $0.30

This 100-page "handbook for Americans" is the best general study of a non-Soviet Communist Party that has ever been published. It begins with the fundamental distinction between the Communist Party of the U.S. and "political parties" as we have previously known them in our history. It proceeds step by basic step to display just what the Communist Party is and how it operates.

There are sections—sometimes brief but always clear and precise — on nearly every important problem: discipline, planning, relation to Moscow, emotional atmosphere, recruiting, the chain of command, underground methods, trade union work, courtroom techniques, fronts, fellow travelling, extent of influence, source of appeal and several dozen more. In the case of a number of the more important topics, the brochure's analytic care and scientific depth are a remarkable feat of compressed presentation. (Actually, 100 pages of Government Printing Office type give the equivalent of at least twice that in an ordinary book.)

Most valuable is this handbook's specificity. The specific dates, names and places are here. The term "fellow traveller" is not explained merely as an abstraction, but is illustrated by hundreds of active names. There is not mere vague talk about "Moscow ties," but a detailed account of just what the ties are, how and through whom they function. Unions and front organizations are named; dues schedules given; party questionnaires and directives reproduced; organizational and statistical tables presented.

The Communist Party of the United States of America is a splendid exercise of what Woodrow Wilson called "the informing power" of Congress. It is worth fifty of the big volumes that are being manufactured by the university Russian Institutes, the foundation offshoots and the Rand Corporations. On a few past occasions, commercial publishers have put out editions of congressional or other

government documents. This would seem a fine chance to combine public service with likely profit. There is no author's or copyright fee when reprinting government material. Properly marketed, a readably printed, paper-bound edition of this handbook would probably achieve the mass sale that its merits and our country's security deserve. J.B.

The New Inquisition: Lore and Hypothesis

The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States, by Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger. 506 pp. New York: Columbia University Press. $5.50

This is a professor's book. It is academic in style. It is academic in ideas. And its value is an academic question.

Nietzsche (himself a great professor—but something more) said of professors: "All threading and knitting and weaving do their fingers understand: thus do they make the hose of the spirit!" Drs. Hofstadter and Metzger knit excellent hose of the spirit. They are detailed, meticulous, neat; their book will keep many professors' feet warm in the cold war. They do excellent research; their discussion of "The European Heritage" (which realizes the mediaeval universities) is fair and fascinating. Their *history* of academic freedom in America is excellent.

But they aren't content to be historians: they wish to be philosophers. And when they import philosophy into their history, they use the stale old gags of the Liberal. Into their history they inject: ". . . the antebellum college teacher, *unlike his successor of today,* did not face anything resembling *a national code of political orthodoxy.*" (Emphasis, here and in subsequent quotes, mine.) They say "the *pattern of inquisition* in that day differs from the one that exists today." They admit that there are some [Communistic] skeletons in professors' closets, but hasten to add: "*not many, to be sure.*" They see, like academic little Orphant Annies, the goblins of conservatism forever closing in with pitchforks: "This makes, or threatens to make, investigations—by trustees, by state legislatures, by *filiopietistic groups* [O rich gem of verbal joy!] a built-in characteristic of academic life . . ." They cast a stone at "the tension of *superpatriotism.*" Loyalty, they report, is always "defined with a woolly vagueness." They say: ". . . certain *pathological types* rose to national prominence: the *informer,* whose repeated purgations of guilt acquired the public's sanction; the *defamer* . . .; the *investigator* . . ." All threats to academic freedom, in a word, come from "administrators," "trustees," "superpatriots," "conservatives."

As for religion, the authors evidently regard it as anti-intellectual and the foe of freedom. They speak of "the *parochialism* of the *denominational college.*" They say: "They indicated . . . how professors could fight for academic freedom *and yet accept the presence of denominational colleges in their midst.*" They are hypnotized against the knowledge that the State is today *Divus Caesar;* and that the small denominational college is almost our last refuge against the superstitious idolatry of that mortal god.

These professors, as Liberals, see truth as the latest modernism, and freedom as a grab for the latest novelty. They say, with approbation, "the searcher regards accumulated knowledge as no more than lore and hypothesis, as fallible as the men who made it." The Greek plays, Bach and Beethoven, Shakespeare, Rembrandt? Are they "accumulated knowledge" that is only "lore and hypothesis"? It was Hitler who said that all history began in 1933; it was George Orwell who, under the shadow of 1984, said that the basic freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two are four.

Conservatives, in point of fact, *never* uphold any "status quo"—because, as fundamental realists, they abide in the changeless creative center that makes the snowflake and the rose forever the same, therefore forever new. Conservatives know that tomorrow's sunrise is the newest thing in the world—*and* the oldest. What these professors really uphold is the bleak status quo of Liberalism and their own vested interests in the academic saddle, where they ride mankind. Why doesn't their history of academic freedom contain some *conservatives* who were purged because they dared to affirm that grass is green and that (even in a Liberal world) an outside has to have an inside? E. MERRILL ROOT

Fashionable Biography

Cervantes: The Man and His Time, by Sebastian Juan Arbó. Translated by Ilsa Barea. 270 pp. New York: The Vanguard Press. $4.00

This book takes its place among the better biographies of literary men produced in this decade. It provides a clear and reasonably accurate account of the vicissitudinous and often pathetic life of Spain's greatest writer. In keeping with current fashion, however, it says as little as possible about him as a writer. There is, for example, a brief statement that Cervantes failed as a playwright in Madrid, but we are not told that he failed primarily because he was determined to observe certain literary standards, while his successful rival, Lope de Vega, cynically wrote "to please the fool who pays." Neither are we told that one of Cervantes' tragedies (the *Numancia,* occasionally performed even today) is the finest expression of Spain's national pride and sober idealism in the brief years of her glory—before the failure of the great Armada subjected her to international humiliation almost as great as that which was brought on us by our ignominious defeat in Korea. Such omissions are, of course, directed by the strange but prevalent assumption that the persons who buy biographies of literary men are not interested in literature. R. P. O.

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To the Editor

As a citizen who is only imperfectly aware of the leaching process his liberties have been subjected to in the last twenty-odd years, I am delighted with the lucid exposition of this subject your magazine gives its readers, whose number I pray is increasing by leaps and bounds.

Toledo, Ohio JOE RYAN

NATIONAL REVIEW is a fine periodical. It is well-written, often amusing, and has a clear and attractive format. But, most important, it is presenting carefully reasoned views on almost every important issue. I particularly agree with your attempt to interweave into one philosophic fabric, the strands of political and social theory and individual ethics. . . .

However, it appears to me that a disproportionate number of articles are in the semi-satiric vein. Readers who now share most of your views will be amused by the satire—but the curious, and uncommitted, readers may be more susceptible to straight analytical expository prose. Again, most of the columns which criticize the views of leading conservative spokesmen assume, in the reader, a degree of familiarity with the literature of conservatism which, perhaps, does not exist.

Washington, D.C. LT. C. H. RUSSELL

NATIONAL REVIEW is so "satisfying." I myself find nothing to criticize and everything to praise. I wish with all my heart I could afford to send subscriptions to all my friends.

I hope you will continue along the lines you have established with such courage and sagacity. I note a few letters to the editor from those who would like to have you temper your opinions. Please don't! Such writing would not be for me. I believe that most of your readers are perspicacious enough to read and appreciate NATIONAL REVIEW.

Dallas, Tex. BILLIE-DAVID ANDERSON

Mr. Bozell's fine reporting on the purpose of the recent White House Conference on Education (December 21, 1955) rates a note of praise.

The Conference's artifice of "group dynamics" to produce favorable results for its sponsors is a brazen insult to the citizens of this free people's republic. That the Administration allowed false propaganda stunts is truly alarming . . . because the technique of "demonstration" is an outrage associated only with dictators and totalitarian states. . . .

New York City JAMES PIGOTT

I have just read "Fear and Owen Lattimore" by Aloise Heath (January 18). This is a gem. Put this writer under contract. Such skillful ridicule may be more effective than ponderous argument. I chuckled from beginning to end. May her product increase.

La Grange, Ill. HORACE W. HACKER

Good luck again, and thanks for a home base. Am keeping a special file of Kendall's amazingly perceptive "The Liberal Line," also that classic on Dr. Dooley.

Denver, Colo. J. S. ELMORE

Julius Epstein's article in your issue of December 21 points to a thing which will make the Katyn Massacre look like a tea-party. I hope you can stir up enough rumpus to get this thing aired fully.

Fort Worth, Tex. DR. MAL RUMPH

I bought your magazine when buying the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor*. A quick perusal of it makes me ask you to refund my twenty cents plus postage.

Bedford, Ohio FLORENCE DAVIS

(Only if you can prove that you have forgotten what you read!) EDITOR

. . . We are enjoying NATIONAL REVIEW tremendously and are so happy to have a magazine that just fills the need! It will have far-reaching effects. I agree with Frank Meyer's request that you keep it on the plane that it is. Do not lower its standards—literary or otherwise.

Phoenix, Ariz. LOUISE L. CHANDLER

NATIONAL REVIEW is an oasis in the desert. The spring has run very dry since 1933. This is a second Valley Forge.

New York City JOHN HARRISON

Why be so genteel with *America* ("On Editorial Policy," December 28, 1955)? After all, these people are convinced liberals. Awhile back they offered in their screed a guide for the "liberal" Catholic.

. . . There is a lot more to the Kirk-Kuehnelt-Leddihn affair than just a simple question of taste. More likely the reason for the return of the manuscripts is the fact that Drs. Kirk and Kuehnelt-Leddihn have declared themselves in black and white as conservatives. And *America*, being professedly liberal, doesn't care for their company.

Washington, D.C. THOMAS MACGILL

I have just finished reading Mr. Buckley's open letter to college editors (December 28, 1955). It seems too good to be true! At last someone has given students like me a chance to protest, to name names, to do something about the awful situation that exists in our schools. . . There have been many times when I have heard talk at school about a teacher, a course, or even a whole department turning education into indoctrination. . . .

In a required course on Literary Criticism, we were generously sprinkled with the "Liberal Line" and sent home with all sorts of suitable thoughts to swallow before the next time. When I agreed with a fellow in the back row who said that radicals are more vocal and aggressive than conservatives, the storm broke. The good professor lost her head. She pointed a shaking finger at me and demanded to know how, when and where.

When I gave examples, she tried to rip apart my facts. She insisted that a poor, struggling Communist can't get a fair hearing.

Queens, N.Y. (NAME WITHHELD)

This reader looks forward to those "state of the university" messages from students, even though Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. plainly doesn't. It is puzzling to imagine why a Harvard professor should be so disturbed at the prospect of man exercising his "right to knowledge and the free use thereof. . . ."

After all, you did ask for the better with the bitter from the boys. Heaven knows we all yearn for some good news from behind the ivy curtain.

Brooklyn, N.Y. PATRICIA MCDONOUGH

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